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The efficacy of government’s action and, as 
a result, the growth of society’s well-being 
depend, to a large extent, on the degree of 
citizens’ involvement in decision-making 
processes and their monitoring. Despite 
the relatively short history of civil society 
in the post-Soviet space, Kazakhstani non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
made some progress in this direction over 
the past five years, especially in the field of 
monitoring revenues in the extractives sector. 
The availability and use of natural resources 
cannot, in itself, increase the population’s 
well-being. For some resource-rich countries, 
oil revenue management has proved to be 
problematic. Torn by corruption and internal 
strife, they have entered the group of so-called 
‘failed states’ with direct experience of the 
‘resource curse.’ 
According to many representatives of civil 
society, economists, lawyers and political 
scientists, the ‘resource curse’ can only be 
avoided by increasing the transparency and 
accountability of revenue management. This, 
in turn, helps reduce levels of corruption, and 
along with the participation of the general 
public in decision-making processes, has a 
positive effect on the economic efficiency of 
government programmes. Having information 
about government revenues is the first 
important step in assessing the efficiency of 
government fiscal management. 
The legal relationship between the 
government and extracting companies is 
established through investment contracts 
for the development, extraction, and 
transportation of resources. These signed 
contracts stipulate the terms of profitmaking 
and distribution between the government and 
companies over several decades. The success 
of developing countries is directly bound up 
with many of these terms, such as the level of 
local content, ecological security, government 
profits, etc. 
Thus, oil contracts are a serious test for 
both those who sign them on behalf of the 
government, and for representatives of civil 
society, whose role is to ensure independent 
control of resource revenue management. To 
achieve this, NGOs must have a clear idea of 
what kind of interests the parties concerned 
have in the negotiation process, and be able 
to distinguish between different kinds of 
contracts.
Given the interest in oil contracts on the part 
of Kazakhstani NGOs, the authors of this 
guide organised a seminar, held in Almaty 
under the auspices of the Soros Foundation–
Kazakhstan, for representatives of more 
than 30 NGOs from different regions of the 
country. Participants had many questions, 
such as: how can representatives of civil 
society monitor contract performance? and 
what should primarily be taken into account 
when examining contracts? 
In view of the general public’s concerns 
over contract transparency and fairness, 
the authors have attempted to answer these 
and other important questions. The Soros 
Foundation–Kazakhstan hopes that this 
report will be of great interest to the public, 
and of particular use to organisations working 
to increase revenue transparency in the 
extractive industries. It is the first publication 
of its kind, not only in Kazakhstan, but also in 
the whole post-Soviet region, and may be seen 
as the counterpart to the report: Covering Oil: 
A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development, 
published in Russian and English by the Open 
Society Institute in 2005.
Anna Alexandrova
The Soros Foundation–Kazakhstan
Preface to the original 2009 report
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In recent years, economic liberalisation, 
improved transport and communication 
systems, and the global demand for energy, 
minerals, and commodities have fostered 
natural resource investment in many poorer 
countries. For some commentators, this 
trend provides new opportunities to promote 
growth, generate public revenues and create 
employment in countries that have limited 
alternative development options. Others have 
stressed the major risks involved in natural 
resource investments. For example, people 
may lose key livelihood assets, such as land, 
water, and grazing land, while environmental 
damage may have lasting effects on the 
resource base and repercussions for public 
health. 
From the perspective of sustainable 
development, attracting investment should 
not be an end in itself for host countries, 
but rather a means to an end. The ultimate 
goal should be to improve local livelihoods 
while protecting the environment. Many 
governments have made efforts to attract 
more investment, some of it dubious. For the 
quality of investment — assessed for its core 
characteristics, rather than philanthropic 
programmes at the fringes — is as important 
as its quantity. This involves a thorough 
scrutiny of the social, environmental, and 
economic considerations at stake. Key issues 
include public participation in the contracting 
process, the economic fairness of the deal, 
the degree of integration of social and 
environmental concerns, and the extent to 
which the balance between economic, social 
and environmental considerations can evolve 
over often long project durations.
Together with applicable national and 
international law, contracts between investor 
and host government define the terms of an 
investment project, and the way in which 
risks, costs, and benefits are distributed. 
The process for signing the contract greatly 
influences the extent to which people’s 
voices can be heard. Therefore, scrutinising 
contracts is an important mechanism for 
ground-testing competing claims about 
natural resource investments, assessing the 
extent to which opportunities are maximised 
and risks minimised, and for increasing 
accountability in public decision-making. 
Getting the contracts right requires strong 
capacity on the part of the host government 
to negotiate and manage agreements, and 
of civil society, parliamentarians and the 
media to hold governments and investors to 
account. Contracts for large natural resource 
investments are usually very complex, raising 
challenges for negotiators, implementers, and 
scrutinisers. Revenue-sharing arrangements 
in Production Sharing Agreements illustrate 
this point vividly. Together with partners in 
lower- and middle-income countries, IIED has 
been working to strengthen local and national 
capacity to examine contractual issues with a 
sustainable development lens. 
This guide was originally published in Russian 
by the Soros Foundation–Kazakhstan. Its 
content proved invaluable at two training 
sessions on extractive industry contracts 
co-organised by IIED in Central Asia (with 
Kazakhstan Revenue Watch) and in Ghana 
(with the Centre for Public Interest Law). 
The original plan was to simply translate the 
Russian text, but it soon became clear that 
the value of the guide would be increased if 
its content could be adapted, in English, to 
target an audience well beyond Central Asia. 
As a result of this translation and adaptation 
process, the content and structure of the 
present English guide differ in important ways 
preface to the english version of the report
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from the original version, while preserving 
the core analysis and the spirit that inspired 
the original. We hope that this publication will 
be a useful contribution to efforts to improve 
accountability in contracting for natural 
resource investment.
Dr. Lorenzo Cotula
International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED)
Introduction
This guide discusses the provisions of a 
particular type of oil and gas contract, the 
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA). 
While the guide is aimed at a general civil 
society readership, it draws particularly on 
experience from Kazakhstan. 
PSAs have emerged in the past number of 
decades as a popular form for structuring oil 
and gas contracts between resource-endowed 
countries and international oil companies 
(IOCs). While these agreements are not the 
only means for regulating the exploration 
and development of hydrocarbons, they 
have been used extensively in a number of 
producing countries. Although Kazakhstan 
has decided not to use the PSA model for 
future contracts, many major oil and gas fields 
in the country are still being developed under 
such arrangements. Therefore, understanding 
the key characteristics of this model remains 
important in Kazakhstan and elsewhere. 
In countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, 
Kurdistan and Turkmenistan, for example, 
new PSA arrangements are being made. We 
hope this guide will be useful to stakeholders 
in such countries. 
The purpose of this guide is to give an 
accessible account of some key characteristics 
of PSAs, with a focus on revenue issues, and 
to suggest action points for civil society 
organisations involved with monitoring 
extractive industries. Indeed, in recent 
years the public in resource-rich states has 
become increasingly concerned about the 
management of extractive industry revenues. 
This concern is underpinned by a desire to 
avoid the so-called ‘resource curse’: a label 
given to a phenomenon whereby resource-
rich countries are unable to benefit from their 
natural resource abundance. According to 
the ‘resource curse’ literature, the economies 
of resource-rich countries are dependent on 
fluctuations in world commodity markets; 
their political systems are often distorted by 
short-term interests in revenues and rent-
seeking and by a failure to fulfil long-term 
development goals. 
Ensuring transparency and accountability 
in revenue management is a key part of 
avoiding the resource curse. It is with a view 
to achieving this goal that initiatives such as 
the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign 
and the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) were launched in 2002. 
In order to ensure effective control over 
revenues in the oil and gas sector, citizens 
need to have a deeper understanding of 
the often complex issues concerning the 
industry. Thus, oil and gas contracts are of 
paramount importance, as they describe each 
party’s rights and obligations, and the main 
principles used to determine revenue sharing.
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While the guide draws primarily on 
experience from Kazakhstan, a few examples 
from Azerbaijan will also be mentioned. 
Contracts are confidential in Kazakhstan, but 
Azerbaijan is one of the few countries where 
civil society has access to contract documents, 
and insights can be gained from comparing 
experience in the two countries.
The first chapter will contextualise PSAs by 
presenting a broad overview of the oil and gas 
industry in Kazakhstan and by discussing how 
the particularities of this sector create specific 
challenges for contractual arrangements. 
Chapter two considers the principles of oil 
sharing between the government and the 
investor: the hallmark of any PSA. Chapter 
three is an overview of the taxation system 
in Kazakhstan as it relates to the oil and gas 
sector. And chapter four focuses on how civil 
society may use the information presented in 
this guide to promote greater transparency 
and accountability.
part 1
putting the psa  
into context 
An introduction to Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry
This chapter sets the scene for analysing PSAs. 
Kazakhstan has used PSAs to structure many 
of its hydrocarbon development projects, 
and thus provides an appropriate contextual 
starting point for understanding PSAs more 
deeply. As mentioned, no new PSAs will be 
signed in Kazakhstan as a result of a new 
Subsoil Use Law adopted in 2010, but existing 
PSAs will remain in force to regulate major 
oil development operations in the country. 
Kazakhstan’s experience is also valuable to 
other countries using or considering using 
PSAs.
The chapter provides a brief background 
on the history of oil and gas development 
in Kazakhstan, the risks prevalent in the oil 
and gas industry, and the various types of 
contractual arrangements that have been 
developed.
1.1 The origins of oil development 
in Kazakhstan
The first pages of the history of oil in 
Kazakhstan are set in the Atyrau region, an 
area bordering the northern shores of the 
Caspian Sea, and rich in hydrocarbons. In 
1890, an expedition led by Grum-Grzhimailo 
undertook a very detailed geological survey 
of the area, and in 1899 the areas containing 
hydrocarbons were sold to the Russian 
entrepreneurs Lemap, Doppelmayer, and 
Grum-Grzhimailo, founders of the Emba-
Caspian Partnership. At the Karachunul field, 
21 wells were drilled to depths of 38 to 275 
metres, and in November 1899, oil was first 
produced and Kazakhstan’s oil industry was 
born. 
Gas condensate
is a mixture of liquid hydrocarbons, 
emitted from natural gases when the 
temperature is lowered and different 
pressures are applied. Gas condensate 
can be used as a fuel, or treated to 
become benzene, diesel or furnace oil.
The first field of industrial significance, the 
Dossor field, was discovered in 1911, and two 
years later the Makat field was discovered by 
the Nobel company. Infrastructure developed 
to keep pace with the annual increase in the 
volume of oil production in Kazakhstan. 
Pipelines were built and the port of Guryev 
became increasingly developed. However, 
until the 1970s, Kazakhstan remained a 
fairly small producer of hydrocarbons. 
This all changed in 1979 with the discovery 
of the super-giant Tengiz1 field and the 
Karachaganak gas condensate field.
1  At the time of discovery, the Tengiz field ranked as one of the five largest oil fields in the world.
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Despite these major onshore discoveries, 
Kazakhstan only began developing its offshore 
fields in the Caspian following independence 
in 1991. As it initially had neither the 
appropriate technology nor the experience 
to do so, Kazakhstan signed PSAs with IOCs 
in 1997 to explore and develop the northern 
Caspian Sea. The prospecting work resulted 
in the discovery of four gas condensate fields, 
one of which, the Kashagan field, ranks among 
the largest fields discovered in the last 30 
years.
In addition to these initial PSAs, Kazakhstan 
made intensive efforts to encourage 
and expand investment in hydrocarbon 
exploration and development during the 
first years of the 21st century. To facilitate 
this policy, Kazakhstan concluded bilateral 
agreements with Russia and Azerbaijan on the 
division of the Caspian. Although the policy 
focus of Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbon industry 
has fluctuated in the past few decades, the 
main thrust of new growth in the oil industry 
remains centred on developments in the 
offshore potential of the Caspian. 
By 2015, Kazakhstan plans to more than 
double production, from 65 million tonnes 
in 2006 to over 150 tonnes in 2015. In 2010, 
production was at approximately 79.7 million 
tonnes.2 These goals are largely consistent 
with statements made by the president of 
Kazakhstan at an international conference in 
October 2007, where he announced that plans 
for oil production were targeted at 80 million 
tonnes in 2010, increasing to 130 million 
tonnes by 2015.
1.2 Oil reserves and oil production 
in Kazakhstan
Estimating the exact volume of hydrocarbons 
available or accessible in any single country at 
any one moment is exceedingly difficult. This 
is especially true in the case of Kazakhstan, 
where intensive exploration continues 
through to the present. As seen in Figures 1 
2 There are two methods of measuring the quantity of oil extracted: million barrels per day or million 
tonnes per year: 1 million barrels per day equals 49.8 million tonnes per year.
Figure 1. Percentage of proven oil reserves
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011
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and 2, Kazakhstan is currently ranked ninth in 
the world in terms of proven oil reserves. 
In the regional context, the 2.9 per cent of 
the word’s reserves held by Kazakhstan are 
significantly less than the 5.6 per cent held 
by Russia, and significantly more than the 0.5 
per cent held by Azerbaijan. For Kazakhstan, 
this percentage represents approximately 
39.8 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. 
Comparatively, the reserves held by Saudi 
Arabia, the world’s largest, stand at 264.5 
billion barrels.
In addition to oil, Kazakhstan also produces 
gas condensate and natural gas (Table 1). 
Gas condensate is usually included in oil 
reserve statistics. Natural gas statistics, on the 
other hand, are determined independently. 
Kazakhstan holds an estimated 1 per cent 
of global proven reserves in natural gas. 
This translates into 1.8 trillion cubic metres 
of extractable natural gas. By comparison, 
the reserves of natural gas held by Russia, 
the world’s largest, stand at 44.8 trillion 
cubic metres. According to statistics from 
Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Oil and Gas, 
the country has 169 fields of confirmed 
hydrocarbons resources: 87 oilfields, 17 gas 
fields, 30 mixed oil and gas fields, and 35 gas 
condensate fields. Moreover, two-thirds of the 
extractable reserves come from six fields with 
over 50 per cent coming from the Kashagan 
and Tengiz fields alone.
In terms of output, 2010 statistics show 
that Kazakhstan accounts for 2.1 per cent of 
global oil (including condensate) production. 
This places Kazakhstan as the 14th largest 
producer in the world. At current rates of 
production, proven oil reserves are estimated 
to last approximately 50 years. Natural gas 
production in Kazakhstan is significantly 
less than its oil production, accounting for 
less than 1 per cent of the annual global total. 
However, if natural gas production were to 
remain at its current annual rate of 37.4 billion 
cubic metres, Kazakh proven gas reserves (1.7 
Figure 2. Percentage of daily oil production
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2011
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per cent of global reserves) would last for over 
100 years. 
While Kazakhstan aims at being a top ten 
oil producer by 2015, significant challenges 
exist. Given the difficulty in developing 
many of the country’s largest fields, and the 
suboptimal chemical composition of most 
of Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbons (high sulphur 
content and hydrogen sulphide compounds), 
realising large-scale development projects in 
Kazakhstan requires significant investment, 
consistent and effective governance, and 
specialised technological knowhow.
1.3 Risk and reward in the oil and 
gas industry
The oil and gas industry is based on the 
exploitation of natural resources, and 
in economic terms, this involves the 
management of both the receipt and 
distribution of rent. In the context of natural 
resources, economic rent is defined as any 
income earned from the scarcity of a finite 
resource. While this may state a truism with 
regard to natural resources, its significance 
becomes apparent when placed in the context 
of geographic limitations. Businesses engaged 
in the extraction of hydrocarbons must go 
where those hydrocarbons are located. The 
combination of a finite resource and its 
location in specific geographic areas means 
that the oil and gas industry is presented with 
challenges that are not always present in other 
sectors.
As such, oil businesses can obviously only be 
conducted where hydrocarbons are available. 
Currently, there are about 50 oil-producing 
countries in the world, and production costs 
differ widely among these geographic regions. 
In addition, the geological characteristics 
of the hydrocarbons largely determine 
production costs. For example, offshore 
development tends to be significantly more 
expensive than onshore development. To 
illustrate, Table 2 below shows that costs are 
lower in the Middle East, where oil is pumped 
from onshore oil fields with relative ease, 
whereas pumping from offshore North Sea 
fields and offshore fields in the Gulf of Mexico 
is far more expensive.
Table 1. Production of hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan
Year Oil production + condensate (million 
tonnes)
Natural gas 
(billion cubic metres)
2003 51.4 16.6
2004 59.4 22.1
2005 61.5 25.0
2006 65.0 26.4
2007 67.1 29.6
2008 70.7 32.9
2009 76.5 35.9
2010 79.7 37.4
Source: The Agency of Statistics for Kazakhstan, 2011. 
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Although National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
now produce more of the world’s oil than 
the once- dominant western International 
Oil Companies (IOCs), IOCs continue to 
seek lucrative deals in countries where 
hydrocarbon development has been a 
relatively new enterprise, such as West Africa 
and the former Soviet Union (FSU). This 
means that the governments of a number of 
low- and middle-income countries, where 
new oil fields have recently been discovered, 
face a difficult choice of either contracting out 
production to IOCs experienced in pumping 
methods and technologies, or waiting for local 
or state-owned companies to gain sufficient 
capacity to develop resources on their own. 
In the majority of cases, financial necessity 
and the desire for regional dominance have 
driven government policy decisions to accept 
cooperation with foreign companies in order 
to develop the fields as quickly as possible.
Given this reality, it is unsurprising that 
resource-rich countries often turn to foreign 
oil companies for capital and expertise. 
But herein lies the challenge: how can the 
governance of relationships with foreign oil 
companies be sufficiently balanced so that the 
hydrocarbon wealth is shared, commensurate 
with sovereign ownership of the resource, 
on the one hand, and the value-added by the 
foreign oil company in extracting the resource 
on the other? Over the past few decades, 
governments have looked to increasingly 
sophisticated methods of contracting to deal 
with this challenge. While these various types 
of contracting methods will be introduced in 
the next section, it may be useful to highlight 
some of the financial reasons for needing such 
complex legal instruments for governing the 
relationship between host states and foreign 
investors.
The development of oil and gas fields 
requires capital and that capital can come 
from a number of financing sources. How 
oil companies finance operations is of 
great importance, and a few strategies are 
3  Upstream production costs include both finding and lifting costs. 
Table 2. Average upstream production costs3
Region 2006–2008 
(2009 USD per Barrel of Oil)
2007–2009 
(2009 USD per Barrel of Oil)
United States 41.49 33.76
Canada 38.75 24.76
Europe 72.32 53.37
Former Soviet Union 16.70 20.96
Africa 42.24 45.32
Middle East 17.09 16.88
Worldwide 34.71 29.31
Source: EIA Performance Profiles of Major Energy Producers, 2009.
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highlighted in the next few paragraphs. 
The importance of financing in oil and gas 
projects relates to a number of underlying 
peculiarities specific to the industry. Oil 
field development projects are not only 
capital-intensive, they are risky and long-term 
investments, taking from 25 to 40 years 
to fully develop, and requiring significant 
Box 1. The stages of oil project development
Negotiations
1. The government issues an invitation to tender for the exploration and development 
of fields.
2. The company buys geological and geophysical data from the government. 
3. The company carries out a commercial assessment to choose a field.
4. The company submits a bid to the government.
5. An agreement is reached with the government by way of signing a memorandum of 
understanding.
6. Negotiations begin with the government to stipulate the details for agreement.
7. A protocol is signed to signify approval of the details of the agreement.
8. A contract is signed with the government.
9. The contract is ratified by the government.
Exploration
1. An operating company is set up to execute the contract.
2. The company accepts the contract area from the government.
3. Geophysical surveys are carried out.
4. Based on the results of the survey, a drilling site is chosen for an exploration well (or 
wells).
5. Announcements are made about the discovery of hydrocarbons or an assessment is 
made of commercial hydrocarbon reserves.
6. A field development programme is prepared (technical and economic feasibility 
analysis).
7. The government approves the field development programme.
Development
1. Technical work (construction) begins at the contract area site.
2. Infrastructure is developed for the transportation of hydrocarbons.
3. Production wells are drilled.
Production
1. Hydrocarbons are extracted. 
2. Hydrocarbons are transported to the processing site.
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investment throughout the whole of the 
project. Having made such huge investments, 
companies then plan to make a return over 
project duration; but this can be very long. 
This risky, long-term, capital-intensive nature 
of projects creates special challenges for 
financing. In turn, financing arrangements 
can have significant implications for investor-
state contracts. 
Three common ways to finance the 
development of oil and gas projects are 
self-financing, borrowing and partnering. 
Self-financing refers to a practice usually 
limited to large IOCs and NOCs. Under this 
arrangement, capital investment strategies 
are determined internally and capital is 
dispersed for specific projects without 
recourse to outside lending or cooperation 
with partnering companies. While only a few 
very large IOCs can self-finance operations, 
it is more typical among many of the larger 
NOCs in the Middle East, Latin America and 
Russia. For smaller companies and smaller 
developing countries, borrowing from banking 
institutions is an alternative for securing 
capital for oil and gas projects. From a civil 
society perspective, bank involvement in the 
development of oil and gas projects can be 
beneficial: international benchmarks, such 
as the Equator Principles, related to lending 
have emerged in recent years to help mitigate 
some of the social and environmental risks 
associated with natural resource projects, and 
may provide effective levers for civil society 
scrutiny. 
In practice, oil companies increasingly 
obtain financing from a variety of sources, 
with combinations of self-financing and 
borrowing not uncommon. Also, an important 
risk mitigation strategy employed by oil 
companies is to facilitate partnerships such as 
joint ventures and consortia. This can include 
several IOCs, and/or an IOC (or a consortium 
of IOCs) and a State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE), such as a national oil company. This 
diversification of capital and expertise assists 
in the realisation of projects that may be too 
risky, either economically and/or politically, 
for any single entity to enter onto its books. 
As contracts for the exploration and 
development of oil resources always involve 
a relationship between one or more oil 
company, on the one hand, and a government 
agency or SOE which owns the buried oil, 
on the other, a key question is how the rent 
generated by the project is divided between 
the parties. This has been a difficult issue for 
the oil and gas industry since its inception. 
In recent decades, the methods and means 
for determining the hydrocarbon share 
between national governments and IOCs 
have shifted. A popular incarnation of this 
shift is the Production Sharing Agreement 
(PSA). Indeed, early relationships between 
resource-rich countries and IOCs were 
governed by concessions. In their original 
formulation, concessions are more than 
contracts: they vested property rights in 
the unproduced hydrocarbons to the IOC. 
This arrangement became untenable in the 
post-colonial era, when developing countries 
were promoting what was proposed as a more 
equitable ‘New International Economic 
Order.’ Modern concessions are actually 
tax-and-royalty agreements, and do not vest 
title in unproduced hydrocarbons. But new 
contract models, such as PSAs, have become 
increasingly common in the developing world. 
The next section outlines the various types of 
contractual arrangements that can be used to 
regulate the development of hydrocarbons.
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1.4 Oil agreements: Different 
types of contracts, different 
levels of responsibility
In terms of capital and expertise, attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Kazakhstan 
remains as important today as in the early 
years of independence. Kazakhstan continues 
to pursue policies aimed at attracting FDI 
in capital-intensive and technologically 
challenging projects in the oil and gas sector. 
Where attracting FDI is a key concern, legal 
mechanisms for both the protection and 
promotion of these investments are crucial. 
For the oil and gas industry, the legal 
structures that regulate the development of 
hydrocarbon resources can be divided into 
micro and macro governance structures. 
At the macro level, the government can 
provide legislation regulating investment 
in the mining and petroleum sectors and 
related taxation. It can also enter into a range 
of bilateral and multilateral investment 
treaties to encourage and protect foreign 
direct investment. At the micro level, the 
government can negotiate contractual 
arrangements that will govern specific 
projects.
The PSA, the provisions of which are 
the focus of this guide, occupy a special 
place in the history of oil contracts. They 
were developed in the 1960s and became 
widespread by the 1990s. While their 
popularity has waxed and waned over this 
period, they are still used in the oil and gas 
industry, especially among IOCs operating 
in low- and middle-income developing 
countries. As stated in the previous section, 
PSAs were developed after the traditional 
concessions become untenable in the post-
colonial era. According to the late Professor 
Thomas Waelde (1995), the PSA produced “a 
convenient marriage between the politically 
useful symbolism of the production-sharing 
contract (appearance of a service contract 
to the state company acting as master) and 
the material equivalence of this contract 
model with concession/licence regimes in 
all significant aspects…The government can 
be seen to be running the show – and the 
company can run it behind the camouflage 
of legal title symbolising the assertion of 
national sovereignty. It is for these reasons 
that the production sharing agreement is so 
important in countries where sovereignty 
needs to be asserted conspicuously, while 
the financial and managerial resources for 
national management are absent.  This new 
conceptualisation of the relationship between 
host state and investor helped solve many 
of the political difficulties concerning the 
development of national resources.”
However, the oil and gas industry is not 
monolithic, and therefore the transition from 
concessions to PSAs can hardly be described 
as a universal move. Also, during the same 
period, NOCs have been on the rise, and often 
IOCs do not participate within the territories 
of these NOC-dominated states. As a result, 
PSAs govern a relatively small percentage of 
global oil production. 
Yet PSAs have been quite popular in the 
former Soviet Union, and in the context of 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, they remain 
influential. But Kazakhstan has recently 
decided that PSAs would no longer be used 
in future exploration and development 
agreements (see Box 2). This change in policy 
does not reflect PSAs already signed; in fact, 
Kazakhstan’s largest fields, Karachaganak and 
Kashagan, are still being developed under the 
PSA model. 
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Box 2. Kazakhstan’s recent 
criticism of the PSA model
The following extract is found in the 
presentation of the new law on Subsoil 
Use to Kazakhstan’s Parliament, 
Majilis Administration (2009): 
Applying a production sharing 
model to subsoil use contracts has 
been the common international 
practice in countries with 
developing or transitional 
economies lacking financial 
resources and technical means for 
independent field development. 
The specifics of subsoil use in 
Kazakhstan (high production 
cost, long transportation network, 
limited internal processing 
facilities) make the production 
sharing concept ineffective, and 
difficult to manage and apply. The 
practice of existing production 
sharing agreements in the Republic 
of Kazakhstan shows that the 
country does not receive adequate 
returns from these projects, even 
with the prices for raw material 
being high. 
The vast diversity of the industry, in terms 
of both policy and context, means that the 
contractual models used in the oil and gas 
industry are as diverse as the industry itself. 
That said, four broad categories of agreements 
are used in the oil and gas industry today: 
PSAs; concessions and licences; joint 
ventures; and service contracts. Each type of 
agreement is briefly summarised below. 
1.5 The Production Sharing 
Agreement
By the mid-20th century, resource 
exploitation has entered a new era, and the 
traditional methods of resource governance 
were increasingly incompatible with 
post-colonial reality. Early concessions 
were perceived as unfair, and many 
newly independent countries pursued 
nationalisation policies that cancelled IOCs’ 
concessions. These countries, which had 
already been producing hydrocarbons for 
many decades, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Venezuela, focused on developing their 
NOCs and locking out IOCs. In low- and 
middle-income countries that had yet to 
develop their hydrocarbons, the options of 
setting up NOCs and excluding IOCs and their 
technical knowhow was not possible. At the 
same time, these countries could not be seen 
as openly giving up sovereignty over their 
natural resources by agreeing to traditional 
concessions. PSAs emerged to fill this gap.
PSAs were first used in Indonesia in the 
1960s. They were signed between IOCs 
and Pertamina, the state oil company of 
Indonesia. What is characteristic of these 
contracts is that the parties concerned share 
the production of the hydrocarbons produced 
and leave title to the unproduced oil with the 
state. Today, the PSA continues to be used 
in relationships between IOCs and some 
resource-rich states (or their SOEs) for the 
exploration, development and production of 
hydrocarbons. The fundamental principle 
of these types of contracts is the notion of 
shared production. Given the time-scale of 
oil field developments, PSAs are often signed 
for a period of 25 to 30 years, although they 
can cover longer periods. For instance, the 
contract to develop the Kashagan oilfield in 
Kazakhstan was signed in 1997 for a period of 
40 years. 
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After the companies have made the stipulated 
investments and extracted the oil, the 
resources are shared between the parties to 
the contract, with the state’s share often going 
to the SOE designated in the contract (often 
an NOC). When a number of companies are 
involved, one of them can be delegated to 
assume the operational management of the 
project. This function is usually assigned to the 
largest investor, who will be in charge of the 
project’s operational management and settle 
any problems and disputes that arise. There 
is normally a distinction between technical 
and commercial operational management: 
the technical is mainly concerned with the 
actual field development process, while the 
commercial is concerned with regulating 
financial settlements and relations between 
the parties regarding production sharing 
calculations.
For the purposes of PSAs, the state is usually 
represented by a NOC that assumes two 
responsibilities: first, that of contractor with 
a relevant share in the contract; and second, 
representing the state’s interests and receiving 
its share of profit oil on behalf of the state. 
The share of the NOC differs from country 
to country, depending upon the manner in 
which the PSA was negotiated and how much 
of a stake the NOC holds in the particular 
project. Many PSA laws require that the NOC 
hold a controlling stake in the project (50 
per cent + 1 share). However, owning a 50 
per cent stake in a project usually requires 
significant investment on the part of the NOC, 
a consideration that can reduce the amount 
of profit initially seen by the state as the 
NOC recoups its capital investment costs. To 
deal with this inconvenience, PSAs are often 
structured so that the NOC contribution is 
‘carried’ (i.e., paid for) by other consortium 
members and the government repays this 
contribution from its share of profit oil.
At present, PSAs have been used in a number 
of resource-rich countries. They have been 
particularly popular in the development 
of hydrocarbon projects in Central Asia 
and on the African continent. However, 
the complexity of the PSA, coupled with 
its inability to deal with the dramatic price 
fluctuations of oil in recent years, has led 
to some backlash against its future use. 
For example, the new Subsoil Use Law in 
Kazakhstan, which came into effect in July 
2010, prohibits the signing of new PSAs for 
future development projects, leaving in force 
PSAs signed earlier. While PSAs differ widely 
in their terms and condition, a number of 
common principles have emerged. A few of 
these principles are summarised below:
•	 On the host state side, an NOC or other SOE 
can be a party to the contract.
•	 The state retains legal title to the 
unproduced natural resources and only 
transfers title to the IOC’s share of the oil 
once it has been produced.
•	 The IOC usually bears the risk at 
the exploration stage (i.e., if no oil is 
discovered). 
•	 PSAs, once negotiated and signed, often 
become part of national legislation.
•	 The state or the NOC grants the IOC the 
right to explore, develop and extract oil.
•	 The IOC invests capital (along with the 
NOC in some cases) and initial capital 
expenditures and on-going maintenance 
costs are deducted from production in the 
form of cost oil.
•	 The IOC receives a share of the produced 
oil in accordance with the PSA. This is 
normally called the profit oil.
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•	 Cost oil and profit oil (and any other 
bonuses, royalties, duties, or taxes) are 
calculated on the basis of the amount of oil 
actually produced.
•	 The parties share profit oil throughout the 
duration of the contract, with taxes on profit 
oil only paid to the government once the oil 
has been received.
1.5.1 Concessions and licences
Modern concession and licensing 
arrangements are contracts whereby the 
government grants the investor the exclusive 
right to exploit natural resources in a given 
area for a specified period of time, in exchange 
for payment of royalties, taxation and fees. 
In principle, concession contracts do not 
involve collaboration in production activities; 
rather, the investor runs operations and the 
government receives revenues. But local 
partners may be involved in production under 
local content provisions that can be included 
in the concession. 
Concessions, like PSAs, mean that the investor 
runs oil operations at its own risk, in contrast 
to a joint venture. But instead of a share of 
the petroleum produced, a concession holder 
usually pays a bundle of taxes and royalties 
on all oil produced. However, hybrids of 
concession and PSA-type arrangements 
are also possible, whereby, for example, the 
investor may be required to pay income tax on 
its share of oil and royalties based on the value 
of production. Unlike PSAs and joint ventures, 
pure concessions rarely involve an NOC or 
SOE in development or production. Payments 
of taxes and royalties are paid directly to the 
state. 
Compared to PSAs, concessions tend to be less 
complicated to negotiate and administer. They 
require less host state capacity in terms of 
proper legal, financial and technical expertise. 
Because of their complexity, PSAs also tend 
to be less amenable to public scrutiny than 
concession and licensing regimes. Whether 
PSAs can be financially more beneficial to 
host countries than concessions depends on 
their specific sharing provisions, as compared 
to tax and royalty rates under concessions.
1.5.2 Joint ventures
Joint ventures involve contracts between 
the investor and a local partner, with a 
view to jointly running a business venture. 
Contracts may entail setting up a jointly 
owned company incorporated in the host 
state and managed by a board where both 
parties are represented (incorporated joint 
ventures). Joint ventures may also be run 
on the basis of contracts alone, without the 
creation of a separate legal entity owned by 
the parties (unincorporated joint ventures). 
Unincorporated joint ventures offer greater 
flexibility than incorporated ones, but require 
additional efforts to contractually develop 
governance structures; incorporated ventures 
can rely on the generally applicable company 
law that is in force in the state where the 
joint-venture company is established. 
Unincorporated joint ventures also lack 
legal identity and therefore limited liability, 
in contrast to incorporated joint venture 
companies, where the parties are only 
responsible for liabilities up to the value 
of their contributions in the company. 
Lack of limited liability may increase the 
accountability of the investment towards 
people who may suffer damage caused by it; 
but in large, long-term and capital-intensive 
investments, the lack of limited liability is 
clearly a major drawback from the investor’s 
point of view. 
Joint operating agreements in the 
petroleum sector are commonly structured 
as unincorporated joint ventures, and in 
lower- and middle-income countries, joint 
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ventures for natural resource projects often 
involve an entity owned by the host state, 
such as an NOC. While a main advantage of 
the joint development model is the diffusion 
of risk among all parties involved in the 
project, it also requires sharing the benefits 
earned. Like any contractual arrangement for 
the development of the state’s hydrocarbon 
resources, joint ventures will stipulate 
the levels of obligation that each member 
of the project carries. Joint ventures can 
be structured to include production-
sharing arrangements, and many modern 
unincorporated joint ventures with NOCs can 
closely resemble the PSA model.
1.5.3 Service contracts
Service contracts, like other forms of 
concessions and PSAs, are used to involve 
IOCs in the development of a country’s 
hydrocarbon resources. Of all the types 
of arrangements possible for governing 
hydrocarbon development projects, the 
service contract is the most limited, and 
very rarely involves profit-sharing, although 
examples of profit-sharing service contracts 
are evident in such instruments as the Iranian 
‘buy-back’ contract model. Service contracts 
normally govern arrangements between 
national and international oil companies 
where the technical capacity of the former 
is limited. NOCs often sign service contracts 
with IOCs to develop particularly difficult or 
challenging projects, where specific technical 
expertise is required. Essentially, service 
contracts are a form of sub-contracting. 
Payment on service contracts varies from 
contract to contract, but can include 
payments in oil produced.
2 part 2anatomy of a psa
How production sharing takes place
At the heart of a PSA is the mechanism to 
share profit between the host state and the 
oil company. This is an extremely important 
aspect of this type of contract, and it is 
impossible to assess the distribution of costs 
and benefits between the parties without 
understanding this mechanism. In PSAs, 
taxes and royalties are usually less important 
than in concessions. In concessions, taxes 
and royalties are a host government’s primary 
source of revenues from its hydrocarbon 
resources. PSAs are different in this respect, 
as they create a type of partnership between 
company and host state whereby oil is shared. 
So in PSAs, the terms for sharing the oil 
produced is a crucial mechanism to influence 
what revenues the host government will 
receive.
In its most simple formulation, the calculation 
of ‘profit oil’ to be shared between the parties 
is quite simple: 
Profit Oil = Total Oil Produced – (Cost Oil +
 
 Royalties)
In practice, this means that the capital 
investment and the on-going maintenance 
costs related to production can be deducted 
(the cost oil) before the remaining oil 
produced (profit oil) is split into two shares: 
the IOC share and the host state share. In 
terms of cost oil, the party or parties investing 
capital in a PSA project recoup their costs at a 
contractually stipulated rate. This rate varies 
from one PSA to another. Some PSAs permit 
capital investors to recover 100 per cent of 
exploration and development costs before 
having to share profit oil with non-capital 
investing parties, such as the host state or 
NOC. Other PSAs permit profit oil to be 
generated from the very start of production. 
In these cases, the amount of cost oil that 
can go towards recovering initial capital 
investment costs is stipulated as a percentage 
of total production (Figure 3).
The parties to the PSA share the profits of 
production in the form of crude oil, rather 
than money. In other words, the state gets 
its share of the profits in the form of part of 
the extracted oil, which it then sells at its 
own discretion. At first glance, this makes 
financial relations between companies and 
the state easier, but as we will see later, it can 
sometimes become an obstacle to transparent 
financial relations. In a three-stage PSA 
process, the investor’s share of the distributed 
oil is subject to a tax on its share of the profit 
oil. In a two-stage PSA process, there are no 
taxes on production. For example, some PSAs 
provide for a larger share of profit oil going to 
the state, but in exchange for the larger stake, 
all taxes are forgone. 
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2.1 A bit of financial theory
The manner in which hydrocarbon production 
is shared under PSAs can be a complicated 
process. To better understand some of these 
complexities, a short summary of the financial 
theories underlying PSAs is warranted. When 
an IOC looks to invest in a project, there are 
thousands of considerations it will make in 
the assessment of costs and benefits. These 
considerations require the calculation of all 
risks associated with a particular project, 
which are not always of a purely financial 
character. 
Long-term strategies require an assessment 
of political and geological risk as well. 
All combined, these assessments require 
complex analysis of all political economy 
considerations applicable to a proposed 
project. Investors want a return on their 
investment, but in the oil and gas industry, the 
long-term and capital-intensive nature of oil 
and gas projects — coupled with the realities 
of political instability, regulatory change, 
geological uncertainty, and price fluctuation 
— lead to high level of unpredictability. To 
counter some of these risks, a number of 
financial tools are used to assess risks and 
returns.
In the case of hydrocarbon development 
projects, an investor typically invests large 
amounts of capital up front before generating 
any revenue. The longer it takes for a project 
to generate revenue, the higher the profits 
need to be. This is because the money invested 
in a project today is more expensive to recoup 
in the future. Future profits, therefore, must 
be calculated in terms of the current value of 
the investment. To do this, project analysts 
use a financial concept called net present 
value (NPV). NPV expresses the value of 
future revenue in relation to the value of 
currently invested capital. Economists call 
this process discounting.
Figure 3. Oil distribution under PSAs
Source: IMF 
Total production
Cost oil
Investor’s share
Tax on share
State’s share
Total state shareTotal investor’s share
Profit oil Royalty
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2.1.1 Net present value
When looking to calculate the NPV of a 
project (Table 3), two key parameters must 
always be kept in mind: first, interest rates 
on monies borrowed for making capital 
expenditures on large-scale hydrocarbon 
development projects; and second, inflation: 
a process whereby the value of money today 
is worth less in the future. One need not be a 
financier to understand the adverse effects of 
inflation on money; it is sufficient to observe 
changes in the price for the same goods within 
a year. Most certainly, in a year’s time, when 
buying the same type of product, you will have 
to spend more money; how much more will 
give an idea of the annual inflation rate.
The NPV is calculated with the following 
formula: 
      N   
CtNPV = C0 + S 
     t=1 
(1 + r)t
or
    N  
CtNPV = S 
   t=0 
(1 + r)t
where:
t = time
N = total length of project
r = discount rate (rate of return on investments)
Ct = cash flow
C0 = amount of initial investment
Table 4 illustrates an example of NPV and its 
use in financial analysis. A corporation must 
decide whether to introduce a new product 
line. The new product will have start-up 
costs, operational costs, and incoming cash 
flows over six years. This project will have an 
immediate (t=0) cash outflow of USD100,000 
(which might include machinery and 
employee training costs). Other cash outflows 
for years 1 to 6 are expected to be USD5,000 
per year. 
Cash inflows are expected to be USD30,000 
each for years 1 to 6. All cash flows are after-
tax, and there are no cash flows expected after 
year 6. 
The required rate of return is 10 per cent. The 
present value (PV) can be calculated for each 
year
Table 3. Net present value
If ... It means ... Then ...
NPV > 0 The investment would add 
value to the firm.
The project may be accepted. 
NPV < 0 The investment would 
subtract value from the firm.
The project should be turned down. 
NPV = 0 The investment would neither 
gain nor lose value for the 
firm.
The project adds no monetary value; decisions 
should be based on other criteria, such as strategic 
positioning or other factors not explicitly included in 
the calculation; however, NPV = 0 does not mean 
that the project is only expected to break even, in the 
sense of undiscounted profit or loss; it will show net 
total positive cash flow and earnings over its life.
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The sum of all these present values is the net 
present value, which equals USD8,881.52. 
Since the NPV is greater than zero, it would 
be better to invest in the project than to 
do nothing, and the corporation should 
invest in this project, if there is no mutually 
exclusive alternative with a higher NPV. 
NPV is especially important in the context 
of PSAs because it is a prerequisite to the 
calculation of the internal rate of return 
(IRR), which is discussed in the next 
section. In order to calculate the IRR, NPV 
must be known.
2.1.2 Internal rate of return
The other key tool for financial analysis in 
PSAs is the internal rate of return (IRR), 
which compares and shows the profitability of 
investments. Given a collection of pairs (such 
as time and cash flow) involved in a project, 
the IRR (the value r in the equation below) can 
be calculated from an NPV that equals zero to 
show the minimum IRR needed for a project 
to be acceptable:
      N  
CtNPV = C0 + S     = 0
     t=1 
(1 + r)t
where:
t = time
N = total length of project
r = discount rate (rate of return on investments)
Ct = cash flow
C0 = amount of initial investment
Table 4. An example of net present value
Year Cash Flow Present Value
T=0 –100
(1 + 0.10)0
USD100,000
T=1 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)1
USD22,727
T=2 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)2
USD20,661
T=3 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)3
USD18,783
T=4 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)4
USD17,075
T=5 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)5
USD15,523
T=6 30,000 – 5,000
(1 + 0.10)6
USD14,112
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Year Cash flow
0 –100
1 +30
2 +35
3 +40
4 +45
An investment is considered acceptable if its 
IRR is greater than an established minimum 
acceptable rate of return or cost of capital (i.e., 
in the case above, an IRR more than 17.09 per 
cent).
2.1.3 The R-factor 
There are different approaches to production 
sharing. Using the IRR to determine the 
production share between the investor and 
the state is one method. At present though, a 
commonly used method for determining share 
of production is the so-called R-factor. This is 
the ratio of cumulative receipts from the sale 
of petroleum to cumulative expenditures. It is 
calculated with the following simple formula:
R =  
Cost recovery + Profit oil – Income tax
         
 Costs
An R-factor of less than 1 would mean that 
costs have not been fully recovered yet: total 
expenditures exceed total receipts. The 
larger the R-factor, the more profitable the 
operation. The royalty rate or government’s 
share of production may increase as the 
R-factor increases. This is a distinct approach 
from the IRR, which is the inverse value of 
the R-factor. When this method is used, an 
increase in IRR would reduce the investors 
share in production. This is because the IRR is 
an indicator of the project’s profitability. 
The theory holds that as the investor’s 
profitability increases, the equilibrium of 
the original agreement is maintained by 
reducing the investor’s share of production 
commensurate with its profitability. Such 
an approach is slightly counter-intuitive; in 
normal business practice, the success of a 
project is rarely a good reason for reducing 
the benefit derived from such an investment. 
But in the case of resource exploitation, such 
a methodology is indicative of state ownership 
of its resources and the protective measures 
put in place to prevent investors from 
receiving windfalls in excess of their fair share 
of production.
Profit-sharing between government 
and investor is based on the principle of 
the investor achieving a certain level of 
profitability or cost recovery. Both the above-
mentioned methods reveal the profitability 
of a particular project at the present moment. 
This information is then used for the 
subsequent identification of proportional 
sharing between the parties. In other words, 
these formulae allow for the estimation of a 
gradual increase in the state’s share in profit 
oil as the investor recovers its costs and 
achieves the level of profit agreed to in the 
contract.
Obviously, in order to calculate the values of 
an IRR or the R-factor, it is necessary to have 
Given the data to the left, it is easy to calculate that when the NPV equals 
zero, the value r equals 17.09 per cent. In other words, the project is 
profitable for the investor when the IRR equals 17.09 per cent:
         30   35   40   45
0 = NPV = –100 +     +     +      + 
        
(1 + r)1
   
(1 + r)2
   
(1 + r)3
   
(1 + r)4
≈ 17.09
         30      35     40     45
NPV = –100 +      +        +      +      = 0
       
(1 + 17.09)1
   
(1 + 17.09)2
   
(1 + 17.09)3  
 
(1 + 17.09)4
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complete information about the investor’s 
capital and operating costs, the volume of 
production at the current moment, and 
the price of crude oil on the world market. 
Only then can a determination of the 
proportion of production sharing between 
the government and the investor be made. 
As a rule, information about current levels 
of production and world prices is easily 
accessible, but capital and operating costs 
of an investor are more difficult to obtain, 
unless the investor has agreed to publish 
these costs. This information is even more 
difficult to obtain if cost data is concealed by 
confidentiality agreements stipulated in the 
contract.  
It is important to note that the profit-
sharing normally begins after the company 
reimburses its current operating and capital 
expenses. Typically, reimbursable capital costs 
include the pre-investment negotiation costs, 
the costs of prospecting and exploration work, 
the payment of bonuses to the government 
and to social funds, and all capital investments 
for the development of the field, including the 
drilling of wells, the construction of surface 
facilities, pipelines, roads, power lines, and so 
on. Operating and maintenance costs are also 
recoverable prior to the calculation of profit 
oil share. These costs are more difficult to 
calculate because they occur throughout the 
project and are likely to vary from year to year. 
2.1.4 Payback period
A final consideration when looking to 
calculate the financial viability of a long-term 
investment project is the payback period. This 
refers to the period of time required for the 
return on an investment to ‘repay’ the sum of 
the original capital expenditures. For example, 
a USD1,000 investment that returned USD500 
per year would have a two-year payback 
period. The payback period intuitively 
measures how long something takes to ‘pay 
for itself.’ All else being equal, shorter payback 
periods are preferable to longer ones. The 
formula used to calculate the payback period 
is as follows: 
         Investments
 Payback period  = 
          Revenues
The payback period is considered a method 
of analysis with serious limitations and 
qualifications for its use, because it does 
not properly account for the time value of 
money, risk, financing, or other important 
considerations, such as opportunity costs. 
While the time value of money can be rectified 
by applying a weighted average cost of capital 
discount, it is generally agreed that this tool 
for investment decisions should not be used in 
isolation. Other measures of ‘return’ preferred 
by economists are net present value and 
internal rate of return. 
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a production sharing 
example
The Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli project
Given this information about the way profit-
sharing in PSAs work, an example in practice 
will be helpful: the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli 
(ACG) PSA in Azerbaijan. The profit oil shares 
and how they are linked to the IRR are as 
follows in Table 5.
Following a number of years of development, 
the first oil in this project was produced in 
1997. In late 1999, the production-sharing 
on the project began, and was initially split 
30/70 with 30 per cent of production going 
to the state and 70 per cent going to the 
investors. As can be seen, at the initial stage 
the investors received a larger share of the oil 
than the government. This was justified by 
the fact that these splits include cost oil in the 
calculation. At the beginning of the project, 
the investors, who had put up the capital costs 
for development, were being reimbursed for 
these costs out of its share of the production. 
However, once most of the capital costs had 
been reimbursed, the ratio changed, and in 
2008, the split was 45/55 with 55 per cent of 
production going to the state and 45 per cent 
going to the investors. 
Take the following hypothetical example of an 
offshore hydrocarbon development project 
in the Caspian, and how the share of profit oil 
could be determined using R-factor or IRR 
(see Table 6). 
Table 5. Rate of return and corresponding shares of production
IRR State share of oil Investors’ share of oil
Less than 16.75% 30% 70%
16.75% to 22.75% 55% 45%
More than 22.75% 80% 20%
Table 6. PSA profit-sharing formula for a hypothetical project
IRR R-factor Investors’ share of production
IRR < 17% R-Factor < 1.4 90%
17% ≤ IRR < 20% 1.4 ≤ R-Factor < 2.6 90 to 10%
20% ≤ IRR 2.6 ≤ R-Factor 10%
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At first glance, the state’s economic interests 
seem protected to a greater degree in 
such a contract. But all is not so simple. In 
practice, there are always many nuances 
that complicate contractual terms and 
it is therefore difficult to say before field 
exploitation whether the government will be 
able to take the opportunity to generate such 
revenues.
As can be seen in the calculations in Table 
7, the maximum oil price was estimated at 
USD60 per barrel. It is likely that these figures 
were estimated in the early 1990s when 
this project was originally being negotiated. 
However, recent years have seen huge 
fluctuations in the price of oil. At current rates 
of between USD80 and 100 per barrel, these 
original estimations are no longer relevant. 
Many PSAs structured in this way have 
since been renegotiated to more accurately 
reflect the market price of oil. In Appendix 2, 
there is a sample list of PSAs in operation in 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. This list includes 
many of the salient characteristics of PSAs, 
including the profit-sharing formulas.
Table 7. ACG project revenue projections based on oil price (in USD 
billions)
Oil price per barrel USD60 USD50 USD40 USD20
IRR 27% 25% 24% 18%
Investor revenue from 
production share 
(including SOCAR)
44 40 32 24
Government revenue 
from production share
180 152 112 24
Tax on investor production 15 13 11 8
Government’s total 
revenue
195 165 123 32
Government’s total 
revenue (including 
SOCAR’s share)
199.4 169 126.2 34.4
Project’s total revenue 239 205 155 56
Source: PFMC
4
part 4
taxation of oil  
agreements
The example of Kazakhstan
At the beginning of this guide, we highlighted 
the important economic concept of rent. 
Some companies gain an advantage over 
others due to the natural characteristics of 
particular fields, as some fields are easier to 
develop than others. Whether just lucky, or 
savvy, operators receive substantial profit with 
little extra effort, whereas others must invest 
heavily in the extraction process.  In most 
resource-rich countries, minerals are owned 
by the state, so the rent is divided between 
the host government and the company. The 
complicated mechanisms for rent sharing are 
normally regulated by the taxation policy of 
the state.
The tax burden for oil companies may vary 
significantly depending on the type of the 
contract. We have already mentioned in the 
previous chapter that where PSAs are in place, 
the state receives its share of profit oil, and 
taxation will not be its primary tool. However, 
taxation is still possible under PSAs, and in 
fact, PSAs often tax profit oil. There is no 
simple calculation for an optimal tax for the 
hydrocarbon industry; an appropriate level 
of taxation requires a contextual analysis of 
the particular rent distribution requirements 
under a particular agreement. 
Under a PSA, the level of profit oil taxation is 
likely to be a smaller percentage than under a 
tax-and-royalty based concession, where the 
amount of tax is the state’s primary revenue 
generator under the agreement. Taxation in 
the hydrocarbon industry is a tool that can 
facilitate the proper balance of rent sharing 
between an investor and the resource-rich 
state. Therefore, the taxation regime has 
to balance a state’s need to benefit from its 
resource wealth (i.e., to get as much income 
out of the resource as possible) against the 
need to attract investors, who likewise want 
to maximise returns on their investment. 
Favouring either party could create unwanted 
consequences: taxation that is overly lenient 
could deprive the state of potential budget 
revenues, whereas a more stringent tax regime 
could limit investment by investors in that 
country’s hydrocarbon sector. 
State policy often focuses on deriving as 
much benefit from its hydrocarbon wealth 
as possible. Where a resource-rich country 
requires foreign investment to develop its 
resources, taxation is a very important tool 
in deriving benefit from the natural resource 
endowment. A discussion of Kazakhstan’s 
taxation system can help illustrate some 
key concepts and tools. The taxation system 
applicable to the development and production 
of hydrocarbons in Kazakhstan is currently 
governed primarily by two major pieces of 
legislation: first, Law No. 291-IV “On Subsoil 
and Subsoil Use” (Subsoil Use Law), which 
came into effect July 2010; and second, the 
revised Tax Code, which came into effect in 
January 2009. Both of these laws, and how 
they historically developed, will be outlined in 
the next section. 
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4.1 A summary of the oil and gas 
legal regime in Kazakhstan
The new Subsoil Use Law of 2010 replaced 
both the prior Subsoil Use law and the 
Petroleum Law of 1995. The most important 
aspects of this new law relates to the 
structure of future petroleum agreements 
in Kazakhstan. While the new law does not 
repeal the PSA Law of 2005 — a separate 
law enacted as a special law governing PSAs 
exclusively — it does require that no future 
contracts be structured as PSAs. For existing 
PSAs, the government issued a statement 
prior to the adoption of the revised Tax Code 
of 2009 stating that the tax provisions in all 
existing PSAs, and one concession agreement 
(Tengiz), would remain in effect. However, 
future petroleum agreements would be 
subject to the new Subsoil Use Law and the 
revised Tax Code provisions. 
The revised Tax Code of 2009 governs the 
taxation rates for oil and gas projects in 
Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan’s taxation system 
is composed of direct and indirect taxes. 
Taxes, levies and other compulsory payments 
are calculated and payable in the national 
currency and are reflected in the annual 
budget of the National Fund, in accordance 
with the Budget Code. Exceptions are made 
for cases where legislative or contractual 
provisions have been made to allow tax-in-
kind or payment of tax in a foreign currency. 
Any tax exemptions or reductions are effected 
through supplementary legislation, or 
contractual provisions in accordance with the 
Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on state 
support for direct investments.  
The revised Tax Code of 2009 lowers 
corporate-income and value-added taxes, 
replaces royalty payments with a mineral 
extraction tax, and introduces excess profit 
taxes, and rent taxes on the export of crude oil 
and natural gas. Investors are also subject to a 
signature bonus, commercial discovery bonus, 
and historical cost reimbursement. Therefore, 
when viewed in conjunction with the new 
Subsoil Use Law, the revised Tax Code sets 
a new taxation scheme for all future oil and 
gas projects. Under the new Subsoil Use Law, 
agreements with investors require separate 
contracts for exploration and production 
operations, shorter time limits on exploration 
contracts, and provide for enhanced 
government authority to terminate contracts 
not in compliance with the law. Further, any 
future tax stability clauses in contracts are 
subject to parliamentary approval. 
For Kazakhstan, the current contractual 
and taxation schemes approved by the 
government are the result of many years 
of modification and adaptation. The 
development of the hydrocarbon industry and 
the legislation governing its operations can be 
split roughly into three periods. Each of these 
periods has seen a number of changes in the 
regulatory and legal framework for governing 
hydrocarbon exploration, development, and 
production. Following is a  brief summary of 
these periods.
The first stage, up to 2004, was marked by 
the first signs of government interest in 
increasing its control over the oil and gas 
sector. Specifically, a number of amendments 
and supplements to the Tax Code became 
effective from January 2004, including a 
list of investors’ expenses that could not be 
reimbursed through oil production, namely, 
those incurred due to non-execution or 
improper execution of the contract. An 
amendment to the Tax Code introduced 
triggers for calculating fixed shares in PSAs. 
The second stage, from 2005 to 2008, also saw 
a number of tax innovations. The Supreme 
Court secured the right of tax authorities 
to exercise control over transfer pricing, 
including that of companies holding contracts 
35InternatIonal InstItute for envIronment and development
part 4 taXatIon of oIl aGreements
with stabilization clauses. Amendments 
introduced to the Subsoil Use Law in October 
2005 were branded by the mass media as 
‘rights of the first night,’ securing the state’s 
pre-emptive right to acquire any shares 
released onto the market. The state was also 
given power to suspend subsoil use when an 
investor was in breach of contract. 
Also, in 2005, a new PSA law was adopted. 
While PSAs were permissible under previous 
legislation, this law was the first dedicated 
specifically to PSAs, and introduced a number 
of conditions and requirements for future 
PSAs. One new requirement granted SOE 
KazMunaiGaz the right to a 50 per cent share 
in all subsequent offshore PSAs. In November 
2007, further amendments to the Subsoil Use 
Law secured the state’s right to unilaterally 
withdraw from a contract if the subsoil user’s 
actions significantly affect Kazakhstan’s 
economic interests and threaten national 
security, particularly where deposits of 
‘strategic importance’ are concerned.
In the third stage,  from 2009 to the present, 
the government has attempted to develop a 
new legal framework for taxation and subsoil 
use. Proposed in 2008, the new Subsoil Use 
Law came into force in July 2010 and repealed 
both the previous Subsoil Use Law and the 
Petroleum Law of 1995. The new Subsoil 
Use Law implements major government 
policy changes in contractual terms and 
local content requirements. This third stage 
also saw major changes to the Tax Code. In 
January 2009, the revised Tax Code came into 
force and provides a new regime for excess-
profit taxes and for rent taxes on oil and gas 
exports. 
4.2 The taxation of oil in 
Kazakhstan
In sum, the recent changes to the 
hydrocarbon taxation regime in Kazakhstan 
mean that there are essentially two ways that 
oil and gas operations are taxed. The first 
taxation model we will call the PSA model. 
The PSA model encompasses the taxation 
method used on existing PSAs in Kazakhstan. 
These taxation provisions, while inconsistent 
with the current changes in legislation in 
Kazakhstan, have been stabilised by tax 
stability clauses in the PSAs and reinforced 
by government statements guaranteeing 
that such clauses will be respected, even 
though the law has now changed. For all other 
operations, the new Subsoil Use law and the 
revised Tax Code will exclusively govern new 
oil contracts. We will call this new model the 
Excess Profit Tax (EPT) model. A summary of 
the differences in the two taxation models is 
highlighted in Table 8.
Table 8 clearly shows that under the EPT 
model, the subsoil user (investor company) 
is responsible for all taxes and compulsory 
payments stipulated in the Tax Code, with the 
exception of the state’s share of production. 
All taxes are payable by the subsoil user in 
accordance with the current tax system and 
any changes thereto. When any work is done 
or services are rendered outside the scope 
of the contract, the subsoil users will pay 
taxes and other compulsory payments in 
accordance with the Tax Code.
Under the PSA model (see Box 3 below), 
the subsoil user gives the state its share of 
production, together with payment to the 
budget of some taxes and other compulsory 
payments set out in the PSA itself. The share 
of production is the most significant element 
of the state’s profit under this model. On 
signing a PSA, the state and the subsoil user 
will stabilise the tax regime, so that any future 
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changes to the state’s tax policy cannot be 
applied to the subsoil user, except by separate 
arrangement between the subsoil user and the 
state.  
The ability to change the terms of taxation 
fixed in a PSA by the parties’ mutual 
consent is an important characteristic of 
Kazakhstan’s legal framework, intended to 
protect Kazakhstan’s economic interests. If 
Table 8. Differences between the EPT and PSA taxation models 
Taxes EPC model PSA model
1. Special taxes and payments on hydrocarbon agreements:
  a) Bonuses Yes Yes
  b) Royalties (mineral extraction tax from 2009) Yes No
  c) Excess profit tax Yes No
  d) Share of production No Yes
  e) Additional payments under PSAs No Yes
2. Other taxes and compulsory payments to the state:
  a) Rent tax on oil and gas condensate exports Yes No
  b) Excise tax on oil and gas condensate Yes No
  c) Land tax Yes No
  d) Property tax Yes No
  e) Environmental fees Yes Yes
  f) Other fees (e.g., waterway navigation fees) Yes Yes
  g) Other taxes and payments Yes Yes
Source: PFMC
Box 3. Taxation of PSAs in Azerbaijan
In Azerbaijan, the profit tax on PSAs varies between 25 per cent and 32 per cent, 
depending on the individual contract. For example, the ACG PSA stipulates a profit tax 
of 25 per cent. Regardless of numerous changes to the country’s tax system, since the 
contract was signed in 1994, none of them have been applied to taxation under the PSA. As 
a rule, most subsequent PSAs signed by Azerbaijan stipulate a profit tax above 25 per cent. 
In addition to the profit tax payable under PSAs, companies pay a social tax to the 
government at the rate of 25 per cent for the Social Protection Fund, of which 22 per cent 
is paid by the company and 3 per cent by its employees.
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the government decides to abolish certain 
taxes or other compulsory payments to the 
budget, due under the terms of a PSA, the 
subsoil user will continue with any such taxes 
or compulsory payments as stipulated in the 
PSA until relevant amendments are agreed. In 
cases where more than one taxpayer (investor 
company) acts as a subsoil user under a PSA, 
the same tax regime is applicable to each 
taxpayer individually. 
Before 2004, tax collection was supervised 
by the Ministry of State Revenue, which 
consisted of the Tax and Customs 
Committees, the Tax Police Committee, 
and a number of other institutions. In the 
administrative reform of 2004, the Ministry 
of State Revenue was abolished, and the Tax 
and Customs Committee (now called the 
Customs Control Committee) became part of 
the Ministry of Finance.
The Tax Committee exercises control and 
supervision over the budget revenue from 
taxes and other compulsory payments, 
and ensures that compulsory pension 
contributions and social payments to the State 
Social Insurance Fund are transferred in full 
and in a timely manner. The committee is 
comprised of the following local agencies: 
•	 inter-regional tax committees
•	 tax committees for the regions and the cities 
of Almaty and Astana
•	 inter-district tax committees
•	 tax committees for districts, cities and 
districts within cities
•	 tax committees for special economic zones.
The functions of the tax committee in relation 
to extractive industries include:
•	 maintaining the state register of taxpayers
•	 monitoring the financial and economic 
activities of taxpayers, producers of oil 
products, oil suppliers, and sales personnel 
at oil depots
•	 maintaining a single database on the 
production and turnover of certain kinds of 
oil products
•	 liaising and cooperating with international 
organisations on issues relating to the 
receipt of taxes and other compulsory 
payments to the budget, and the production 
and turnover of excisable goods
•	 determining forms, procedures and 
deadlines for other state authorities to 
submit data on production volumes and 
turnover of oil products and other necessary 
information for a single database
•	 exercising state control over transfer 
pricing
•	 exercising control over the turnover of oil 
products through accompanying notes 
and declarations on the production and 
turnover of oil products.
In 2007, a designated agency for monitoring 
subsoil users was introduced under the 
Ministry of Finance in Kazakhstan. Its 
main function is to monitor subsoil users’ 
compliance with their contractual obligations 
to pay taxes and make other compulsory 
payments. In a speech to Kazakhstan’s 
Parliament in April 2007, the Minister of 
Finance noted that a number of subsoil users 
were regularly in breach of the tax legislation 
through the application of transfer pricing 
(see Box 4), unauthorised postponement 
of commercial production of minerals, and 
by taking unilateral advantage of the more 
liberal provisions of tax legislation (Expert-
Kazakhstan (2007).
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The following section and Table 9 detail the 
different types of tax payments and duties 
applicable to hydrocarbon development and 
extraction in Kazakhstan.
They include primarily the following, which 
will be described in the next section:
•	 corporate income tax (CIT) 
•	 special taxes and payments, which include 
–– bonuses (signature, production and 
discovery) 
–– mineral extraction taxes (METs) 
–– excess profit taxes (EPTs)
–– reimbursement of historic costs
–– rent taxes on exports
–– export customs duties
–– additional payments. 
A third category, indirect taxes and payments, 
will also be detailed. These include 
•	 value-added taxes (VAT) 
•	 excise duties.
Table 9. Tax definitions
Taxable Item Specific item being taxed (land, income, sales, etc.)
Tax base The sum total of the taxable items
Tax rate Applicable percentage of the tax base payable to the state
Taxable income Gross annual income, less permissible tax adjustments, less permissible 
deductions
Net income Taxable income, less CIT and less tax on net income if payer is a 
permanent establishment of a non-resident entity.
Box 4. Transfer pricing
A transfer price is the price used for internal transactions between divisions of a company. 
The parent company can sometimes treat its office abroad as a paying customer for the 
goods that the company produces. Commercial relations of this nature create obvious 
profit opportunities, as well as giving rise to various local tax exemptions and tax 
avoidance schemes.
Abuse of transfer pricing enables companies to transfer profits to countries or zones with 
a lower tax burden, or even become exempt from (or avoid) taxation in any given state. 
Many countries, therefore, exercise state control over transfer pricing through competent 
bodies monitoring transactions between divisions of companies.
In an interview for Interfax in May 2008, Kazakhstan’s Minister of Finance estimated that 
“since the current legislation on state control over transfer pricing was introduced seven 
years ago, the share of offshore trade went down from 60 per cent to 26 per cent”(Interfax 
2008).
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4.2.1 Corporate income tax
In Kazakhstan, the corporate income tax 
(CIT) is payable by resident legal entities, 
with the exception of government institutions 
and non-resident legal entities doing 
business in Kazakhstan through a permanent 
establishment or earning income from 
sources in Kazakhstan.
Items taxable for the purposes of the CIT are:
•	 taxable income
•	 income taxed at source
•	 net income of a non-resident legal entity 
doing business in Kazakhstan through a 
permanent establishment.
CIT calculations and payment procedures 
are detailed in the Tax Code of Kazakhstan. 
For the purposes of this guide we shall only 
provide a brief commentary on tax-deductible 
exploration costs and preliminary expenses 
preceding field development. 
The list of permissible deductions from gross 
annual income specified in the Tax Code 
for subsoil users includes exploration and 
field work costs as well as preliminary work 
expenses, including estimation and field 
development costs, general administrative 
expenses, signature and commercial discovery 
bonuses paid, and fixed and intangible assets 
expenditure incurred after the commercial 
discovery but prior to the start of production. 
The above costs are deducted from the gross 
annual income in the form of depreciation 
allowances from the moment production 
begins. This occurs after the commercial 
discovery of minerals and allows for a 
procedure entitling the subsoil users to set 
a relevant depreciation rate (the maximum 
value limit is currently set at 25 per cent).
If the subsoil user receives income from his 
activities under an existing contract during 
the period in question, any such deductions 
will be reduced by the amount of income 
received from the following:
•	 during exploration and preliminary work 
before production
•	 from sales of minerals extracted after 
commercial discovery but prior to the 
beginning of production, or
•	 from the partial sale of mineral rights.
Rates for the corporate income tax are set in 
the Tax Code as follows:
•	 20 per cent from 1 January 2009 to 1 
January 2010
•	 17.5 per cent from 1 January 2010 to 1 
January 2011 
•	 15 per cent from 1 January 2011.
It should be noted that earlier PSAs may set 
different rates for the CIT in accordance 
with the Kazakhstan tax regulations in force 
when the contract was signed. As most PSAs 
incorporate a stability clause, any innovations 
and amendments to the tax regulations will 
not apply.
4.2.2 Special taxes and payments 
As outlined above, a number of special taxes 
and payments are applicable to all subsoil 
users under the revised Tax Code of 2009, and 
each will be detailed in subsequent sections.
Bonuses 
There are three types of bonus applicable to 
hydrocarbon development and extraction in 
Kazakhstan: signature bonuses, commercial 
discovery bonuses, and production bonuses. 
Payment of exploration and development 
milestone bonuses to the state is integral to 
most hydrocarbon agreements, including 
PSAs. In the case of PSAs, these bonuses are 
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non-reimbursable and do not count towards 
the state’s profit oil share. Bonuses often come 
just at the right time, as many of them are paid 
to the state during the contract’s initial stages, 
when production has not yet begun and the 
state budget requires a cash injection. These 
bonuses can serve the purpose of ensuring 
financial stability or resolving a country’s 
urgent socio-economic problems.
Signature bonuses: As the name implies, are 
fixed, one-off lump sums, paid by the company 
on signing the contract with the state. Article 
288 of the Tax Code defines it as follows: 
•	 The signature bonus is a one-off lump 
sum paid by the subsoil user to acquire the 
mineral rights for the contract territory. 
•	 The initial amounts of signing bonuses 
shall be determined by the Republic of 
Kazakhstan government on the basis of an 
estimate that takes into account the volume 
of minerals involved and the economic value 
of a deposit.
The signature bonus differs from any other 
special payments applicable to subsoil users 
in the manner in which it is calculated. Most 
countries choose to grant mineral rights by 
tender, where the signature bonus is one of 
the key selection criteria: the higher the bonus 
offered, the greater the chance that the bidder 
will win the contract. In order to ensure a 
certain level of payments from subsoil users, 
the state will set a minimum limit for the 
signature bonus. 
The starting value of the signature bonus 
is defined in the Tax Code. For example, 
hydrocarbon development contracts for 
territories without proven hydrocarbon 
reserves, the starting value will be 3000 times 
the monthly indicator set out in the annual 
National Fund budget. For hydrocarbon 
production contracts, the minimum value of 
the bonus will be much less: approximately 
300 times the monthly indicator value.
For contracts where the hydrocarbon reserves 
are proven, the following simple formula 
is used to calculate the starting value of 
signature bonuses is applied:
(C × 0.04%) + (Cn × 0.01%) =  
Signature  
 bonus
where:
C = the value of the ultimate reserves of 
crude oil, gas condensate or natural gas, 
as approved by the State Commission 
for Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan, in 
commercial categories A, B, C1.
Cn = the overall value of the C2 inferred 
reserves approved and/or accounted for 
in the findings of the State Commission 
for Mineral Resources of Kazakhstan 
for the purposes of current estimation 
of potentially commercial reserves and 
inferred C3 reserves. 
Under the Tax Code, the value of hydrocarbon 
reserves is calculated based on the price of the 
hydrocarbons in question on the International 
Petroleum Exchange or the London Metal 
Exchange on the day the bidding is announced 
for the hydrocarbon rights. When the stock 
exchange price for the hydrocarbons cannot 
be established, the value of extractable and 
inferred reserves is calculated based on the 
total production costs indicated in the work 
programme for the duration of the contract, 
and then multiplied by 1.2.
The starting value of the signature bonus can 
be increased before the bidding for mineral 
rights starts by the decision of the competent 
authority’s tender committee. Signature 
bonuses are part of the industry’s competitive 
process for acquiring licences and are based 
upon the amount of acreage offered and its 
perceived exploration potential.
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Commercial discovery bonuses: 
Considering the geological risks associated 
with hydrocarbon exploration, discovery 
of commercially viable fields is a rarity. 
Nevertheless, commercial discovery bonuses 
are a fairly common reward whenever a 
subsoil user makes a commercial discovery 
within the contract territory of an exploration 
contract. Under the Tax Code in Kazakhstan, 
this bonus is also payable when the additional 
exploration of fields reveals resources 
supplementary to the initially approved 
extractable reserves.
Production bonuses: These are paid 
upon the achievement of certain levels of 
production. Oil companies often give up this 
bonus, opting to pay income taxes instead. 
According to Article 317 of the revised Tax 
Code in Kazakhstan, production bonus 
payments are not applied to subsoil users. 
However, production bonuses are common 
in Azerbaijan. The largest set of production 
bonus payments received by the Azeri 
government is understood to have totalled 
USD300 million, accrued under the ACG PSA. 
The bonuses were paid in stages. The biggest 
bonus under the contract was paid in 1995, 
when the Azerbaijani government sanctioned 
the start of the Chirag field development.
Some of the bonus money received from IOCs 
was used by the Azeri government to support 
the national currency rate, and some went 
to the country’s foreign exchange reserve. 
As had been agreed, the final bonus payment 
was paid in 2004, when the international 
consortium began construction work to 
develop the deepwater areas of the Gunashli 
field, signifying the final development stages 
of the project. 
Mineral extraction taxes (METs): Before 
1 January 2009, all companies engaged in 
the production of hydrocarbons (except 
those operating under PSAs) paid royalties 
to the government, based on production. 
The amount of the royalty payment varied 
according to an applicable rate that was set by 
the government and was based on the volume 
of minerals produced — or the volume of the 
first commercial product manufactured from 
these hydrocarbons — and their taxable value 
(i.e., the world price of oil). The amount of 
royalty set by the contract was usually paid 
in cash, but sometimes in kind. Table 10 
illustrates the distinction between royalties 
and mineral extraction taxes.
However, the revised Tax Code of 2009 
replaced royalty payments with a mineral 
extraction tax (MET). The MET was 
introduced to offset problems relating to 
government claims that transportation 
costs, which could be deducted from royalty 
payments, were being overestimated by 
subsoil users. The MET aims to reduce this 
problem by applying a tax in lieu of a royalty. 
Both the MET and royalties are essentially 
volume-based taxes, with the difference 
between the two deriving only from the 
manner in which the tax is calculated. 
Royalties are calculated after certain costs 
are deducted. The MET excludes these 
deductions and also appears to set a higher 
overall variable rate on production than the 
previous royalty regime (see Table 10). 
The calculation of the MET has been 
criticised by some subsoil users because of the 
way in which the tax is calculated. An Almaty 
attorney specialising in the Kazakh oil and gas 
sector commented: 
Royalty payments took into account the 
specifics of the tax base calculation in the 
industry. For example, for the purposes 
of royalty calculation, the subsoil user’s 
costs in transporting the raw material to 
the sales depot were factored in – which 
is quite logical and fair. With MET, such 
costs are not accounted for. Initially, one 
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of the reasons for replacing royalty with 
MET was the deliberate overstatement 
of transportation costs by the subsoil 
users alleged by the tax authorities, or, 
in other words, compensation for idle 
time to transport companies. This is, 
however, the problem of poor practices 
in tax administration. As regards 
reducing the MET rates for the oil 
production industry, I believe that this is 
a necessary step, at least in this low-price 
environment. In our estimate, the newly 
introduced tax regime for subsoil users is 
paradoxical. The problem is, for example, 
that the lower the oil prices, the higher 
the tax burden ratio will be for subsoil 
users. This results from the high MET 
rates and tightening of the rent tax 
regulations. Overall, one could either 
bring the MET rates down, or account 
for the subsoil user’s significant costs for 
the purposes of its calculation (Gazeta 
Kapital 2009).
In February 2009, the Ministry of Industry 
and Trade for Kazakhstan suggested that, 
due to the current world market outlook, 
the government should temporarily reduce 
MET rates,and introduce a preferential tax 
regime for low-profit fields. However, there 
are already a number of safeguards included 
in the Tax Code regarding the application of 
the MET. In terms of built-in exceptions in 
its application, the following examples are 
insightful: 
•	 For crude oil and gas condensate sold for 
domestic use, the Tax Code stipulates a 50 
per cent reduction in the MET rate.
•	 The MET rates also differ for different types 
of hydrocarbons. 
•	 The MET rate for natural gas is fixed at 10 
per cent, with a special lower rate applied 
to natural gas sold on the domestic market. 
Reduction factors are also stipulated for 
Table 10. Differences between royalties and mineral extraction taxes 
(MET)
Type Royalty MET
Definition A payment made for the right to use the 
subsoil in the process of hydrocarbon 
extraction
A tax paid for each type of hydrocarbon 
produced, and based on reserves of 
such hydrocarbons being approved by a 
specially authorised state body
Taxable item The volume of hydrocarbons produced 
in the tax period
The volume of hydrocarbons produced 
in the tax period
Tax rate Based on the average sales prices in 
the tax period, exclusive of indirect taxes 
and costs of transportation to the sales 
depot
Rates for hydrocarbons calculated on a 
progressive scale from 2 to 6%.
Tax rates for crude oil and gas 
condensate are fixed on a scale (see 
Table 11) based on the volume of 
production and world market prices. 
Tax rates for hydrocarbons calculated on 
a progressive scale from 7 to 20%.
Source: Kazakh Ministry of Finance 
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low-profit, high-viscosity, marginal, and 
worked-out fields. 
•	 The higher rates of the new METs (as 
compared to earlier royalty rates) actually 
balance out, when viewed in light of the 
entire taxation regime for hydrocarbons. 
Under the revised Tax Code, the CIT has 
been substantial reduced in comparison 
with earlier CIT rates.
The MET is based on world market prices, as 
opposed to average sale price under earlier 
royalties. The Tax Code calculates the market 
price for crude oil and gas condensate as an 
average of daily quotes for Urals Med or Brent 
Dtd crudes in a given tax period, based on 
information published in the Platts Crude 
Oil Marketwire. When quotes for the above 
grades are not available from this source, 
quotes from Petroleum Argus are used. 
Box 5. Oil property 
benchmarks
Properties of oil (such as density, 
sulphur content, etc.) can vary from 
country to country and even from well 
to well. This is why the so-called oil 
benchmarks were introduced for the 
purposes of price formation: Urals and 
Siberian Light (Russia), Brent (UK), 
Light Sweet (US). Brent grade oil is 
used as the benchmark for trading on 
the London ICE Futures exchange.
Prices for other oil grades, which 
are not listed separately, are tied to 
the Brent oil price and calculated by 
application of the reduction or scale-up 
factor. Brent Dtd is an international 
crude oil benchmark. It derives its 
name from the fact that the oil supplied 
under this quotation has been assigned 
a loading date, which is set 15 days 
prior to actual delivery.
Table 11. MET rates
Annual production volume (crude oil and gas condensate) Rate %
Up to and inclusive of 250,000 tons  7
Up to and inclusive of 500,000 tons  9
Up to and inclusive of 1,000,000 tons 10
Up to and inclusive of 2,000,000 tons 11
Up to and inclusive of 3,000,000 tons 12
Up to and inclusive of 4,000,000 tons 13
Up to and inclusive of 5,000,000 tons 14
Up to and inclusive of 7,000,000 tons 15
Up to and inclusive of 10,000,000 tons 17
Over 10,000,000 tons 20
Source: Kazakh Tax Code
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The following formula is applied to calculate 
the market price of crude oil and gas 
condensate:
 (P1 + P2 + . . . + Pn)
 
          = S
     n
where:
P1, P2, … Pn = daily average world market 
price for crude oil and gas condensate on 
quotation days in a given tax period.
n = number of quotation days in a given tax 
period.
S = world market price for crude oil and 
gas condensate in a given tax period.
To calculate the daily average world market 
price for crude oil and gas condensate, the 
following formula is used:
          C1 + C2
 (P1, P2 + . . . + Pn) = 
            
2
where:
Pn = average daily world market price for 
Urals Med or Brent Dtd crude oil grades.
C1 = average opening daily world market 
price for Urals Med or Brent Dtd.
C2 = average closing daily world market 
price for Urals Med or Brent Dtd.
The subsoil users classify crude oil and 
gas condensate as Urals Med or Brent Dtd 
standard grades in accordance with the 
crude oil sales agreements. When the sales 
agreement does not specify the grade, the 
subsoil user must classify the crude oil 
supplied under such agreement as the grade 
with the highest average world market price in 
the given tax period.
C. Excess profit taxes: As noted above, the 
EPT applies to subsoil users operating under 
contracts covering projects in hydrocarbon 
development and extraction that are not 
classified as PSAs. This will include all 
agreements signed under the new Subsoil 
Use Law after July 2010, and all earlier 
concession-type (tax and royalty) contracts 
where the stabilisation of tax provisions has 
not been provided for in the contract.
The EPT applies to a specific part (the EPT tax 
base) of the subsoil user’s net income received 
under each contract where the aggregate 
income to deductions ratio allowable for EPT 
purposes is more than 1.25 for the reporting 
tax period. The EPT tax base is the amount of 
net income in a given tax period that exceeds 
25 per cent of deductions allowable under the 
Tax Code at the end of the tax period.
Deductions allowable for EPT purposes for 
each contract are the aggregate of: 1) the 
expenses deductible for CIT purposes under 
contracts during the reporting tax period 
and 2) other expenditures such as: a) costs 
incurred during the reporting tax period for 
the acquisition and/or construction of fixed 
assets, b) expenditures subject to deductions 
through amortization charges, and c) tax 
losses carried forward from earlier periods.
The EPT is calculated by applying the 
respective EPT rate to the tax base (Table 
12). The tax base is calculated in accordance 
with the provisions of the Tax Code and 
any applicable adjustments. Accumulated 
income is the subsoil user’s aggregate annual 
income from the contract inception date. 
Accumulated expenditure is the subsoil 
user’s aggregate deductible expenses from the 
contract inception date.
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Table 12. EPT rates
Ratio of aggregate 
annual income to 
deductions
Tax base Rate % Tax payable to the budget
1.25 or less not taxed  0
1.25 to 1.3 inclusive part of net income for which 
the ratio is 1.25 to 1.3
10 calculated based on the rate of 10%
1.3 to 1.4 inclusive part of net income for which 
the ratio is 1.3 to 1.4
20 calculated based on the rates of 10% 
and 20%
1.4 to 1.5 inclusive part of net income for which 
the ratio is 1.4 to 1.5
30 calculated based on the rates of 
10%, 20% and 30%
1.5 to 1.6 inclusive part of net income for which 
the ratio is 1.5 to 1.6
40 calculated based on the rates of 
10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%
1.6 to 1.7 inclusive part of net income for which 
the ratio is 1.6 to 1.7
50 calculated based on the rates of 
10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50%
over 1.7 part of net income for which 
the ratio is over 1.7
60 calculated based on the rates of 
10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50% and 60%
Source: Kazakh Tax Code
Reimbursement of historical costs
These are payments to reimburse the 
state’s historical geological study and field 
development costs with respect to the 
contract territory. It is a fixed payment 
the subsoil user makes to reimburse the 
state for the aggregate costs incurred for 
geological study and field development of 
the relevant contract territory, prior to the 
signing of a contract on subsoil use. Payment 
for reimbursement of historical costs is not 
applicable to contracts that only cover the 
exploration of mineral fields without the 
production of minerals.
The aggregate historical costs incurred 
by the state for geological study and field 
development on the relevant contract 
territory are calculated by a specially 
authorised government body, in accordance 
with the legislation of Kazakhstan. Pursuant 
to the law of Kazakhstan, part of the 
reimbursable historical costs is paid into the 
budget for geological information owned by 
the state. The remaining amount goes to the 
budget as a payment for the reimbursement of 
historical costs. 
Rent tax on exported crude oil
Rent tax on exported crude oil and gas 
condensate is payable by individuals and legal 
entities carrying out export sales of crude oil 
and gas condensate. Importantly, companies 
operating under PSAs are exempt from this 
tax. The rent tax base is the value of exported 
crude oil and gas condensate, calculated on 
the basis of the volume of exported crude oil 
and gas condensate and the world market 
price (Table 13). The government may decide 
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to replace the payment of rent tax in money 
with payment in kind.
Export customs duty on crude oil
In May 2008, the government of Kazakhstan 
announced the introduction of export 
customs duty on crude oil and gas condensate. 
Export customs duties on crude oil and gas 
condensate are part of the revised Tax Code 
regime of 2009. The duty is calculated as a 
percentage of the world market price when 
the duty is accessed. When first introduced 
in May 2008, the duty was set at 109.91 per 
tonne. This was calculated based on a world 
market price at that time, which then stood at 
USD714 per tonne.
Subsoil users operating under PSAs with 
a customs duty stability clause were 
not affected by the introduction of the 
export customs duty. The situation with 
Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO) 
consortium is a good illustration of this point, 
as the PSA they had signed with the state 
stipulated tax stability, but not the stability of 
Table 13. Rent tax rates
World market price of crude oil (and gas condensate) Rate %
Up to USD20 per barrel, inclusive  0
Up to USD30 per barrel, inclusive  0
Up to USD40 per barrel, inclusive  0
Up to USD50 per barrel, inclusive  7
Up to USD60 per barrel, inclusive 11
Up to USD70 per barrel, inclusive 14
Up to USD80 per barrel, inclusive 16
Up to USD90 per barrel, inclusive 17
Up to USD100 per barrel, inclusive 19
Up to USD110 per barrel, inclusive 21
Up to USD120 per barrel, inclusive 22
Up to USD130 per barrel, inclusive 23
Up to USD140 per barrel, inclusive 25
Up to USD150 per barrel, inclusive 26
Up to USD160 per barrel, inclusive 27
Up to USD170 per barrel, inclusive 29
Up to USD180 per barrel, inclusive 30
Up to USD190 per barrel, inclusive 32
USD200 and higher 32
Source: Kazakh Tax Code
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customs duties. KPO were therefore forced 
to pay the export customs duty on the same 
basis as everyone else. It is difficult to say 
why the company failed to fully safeguard its 
interests and foresee such developments, but 
this example shows the economic relevance of 
payment stability clauses in contracts. 
The government explained the introduction 
of the new duty as being necessary to protect 
the domestic oil products market and secure 
additional revenues. Between May and 
December 2008, the government was hoping 
to secure an additional USD1 billion, but oil 
prices crashed two months after the Export 
Customs Duty was introduced, making the 
influx of such significant revenues unrealistic. 
When the revised Tax Code took effect in 
January 2009, subsoil users became liable for 
the Rent Tax (described earlier). Although the 
Export Customs Duty was not repealed, the 
Rent Tax replaced it. In late January 2009, 
the government announced that the Export 
Customs Duty rate for crude oil and gas 
condensate would be set at zero.
Additional payments
The prior Tax Code in Kazakhstan, which was 
in force between January 2004 and January 
2009, stipulated a so-called additional 
payment from subsoil users for companies 
operating under PSAs. This payment was 
introduced to stabilise the state’s revenue 
under PSAs, so that a minimum share of 
production in any given tax period could be 
guaranteed:
Five to10 per cent of production volume from 
the moment production begins until a return 
is received on investment, and 40 per cent of 
production volume in subsequent periods.
In this context, the state’s revenue share 
under a PSA is equal to its production share 
plus taxes and other compulsory payments 
to the budget, exclusive of VAT and taxes for 
which the subsoil user acts as a tax agent. The 
additional payment from the subsoil user is 
not stipulated in the revised Tax Code of 2009. 
4.3 Indirect taxation
In addition to the standard direct taxes 
described in the previous section, there are 
also two types of indirect taxes that are worth 
mentioning: a) VAT and b) Excise Duties.
4.3.1. Value-added tax 
Pursuant to the revised Tax Code, crude oil, 
natural gas, and gas condensate sold within 
the country are subject to a 12 per cent VAT. 
The same tax rate is applied to goods and 
equipment imported for the oil and gas sector. 
Some contracts contain clauses exempting 
the subsoil users from VAT charged on 
imported goods, usually specifying a list of 
such goods. In Kazakhstan, export sales of 
crude oil, natural gas, and gas condensate are 
not subject to VAT. Geological exploration and 
reconnaissance services are also VAT exempt. 
It is notable that in neighbouring Azerbaijan, 
all equipment and materials imported for 
the purposes of field development under PSA 
contracts are VAT exempt. 
4.3.2. Excise duties
Both domestically manufactured and 
imported goods are subject to an Excise 
Duty in Kazakhstan. For example, an Excise 
Duty is applied to petrol (with the exception 
of aviation fuel) and diesel fuel sold on a 
wholesale and retail basis. However, the 
Excise Duty rate for crude oil, including gas 
condensate, is zero. Rates for Excise Duties 
are set by the government and charged as a 
percentage of the price of goods and/or in 
absolute terms (per unit of measure). The Tax 
Code clearly distinguishes between wholesale 
and retail. For example, the shipment of 
non-aviation and diesel fuel to a company’s 
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own divisional structures for further sales 
is classified as wholesale, whereas using 
manufactured or purchased non-aviation fuel 
for the company’s own production needs is 
classified as retail.
4.4 Tax burden ratio
The tax burden ration (TBR) is usually defined 
as the ratio of aggregate taxes and other 
compulsory payments to the budget (exclusive 
of debt repayments) to the company’s 
aggregate annual income in the reporting 
period. This ratio is usually measured as a 
percentage. The TBR is useful for the purpose 
of measuring the attractiveness of a country’s 
tax regime to investors. From the public 
point of view, a subsoil users’ TBR may be an 
important indicator of how fairly the rent is 
shared between the subsoil user and the state.
The Executive Director of the KazEnergy 
Association says that the “TBR for 
KazMunaiGaz Exploration and Production 
is 35 per cent when calculated by the 
Ministry of Finance, and 51 per cent when 
the international calculation method is 
employed”(Panorama 2007). The Vice-
Minister of Finance for Kazakhstan says that 
“at present, the tax burden for the natural 
resources sector in Russia varies between 
60 and 65 per cent depending on the field. 
We have compared our taxation to that of 
Alaska, Mexico, Bolivia and Venezuela, and 
Kazakhstan today looks like an absolute tax 
haven for oil companies. Certainly no-one is 
going to die if we were now to introduce a little 
tax increase” (Panorama 2008).
Nevertheless, one should be cautious when 
comparing TBRs for different countries and 
sectors. There are, in fact, a large number 
of TBR calculation methods, which differ in 
both the taxes taken into account, and the 
TBR base, which can include sales proceeds, 
company profits or even added value.
Depending on the method used, the TBR 
value can vary by a factor of two or more. 
Therefore, before conducting any comparative 
analysis, it is important to make sure that the 
TBRs compared have been calculated by the 
same method. In terms of macroeconomics, 
the TBR can be used in accessing the proper 
amount of GDP should go to the state through 
taxation and other payments. The relative 
tax burden can be calculated by the following 
formula:
Sector’s share in the state’s aggregate tax 
revenue × 100%
Sector’s share of the GDP
This method of calculating the relative tax 
burden is best for international comparative 
analysis as it precludes any dispute as to the 
TBR base.4
4 Summaries of Kazakhstan revenues from the oil and gas industry are available at the Ministry of 
Finance website. See www.minfin.kz.
part 5
what civil society  
can do
It is widely accepted that, through informed 
scrutiny of state-investor deals, civil society 
can provide the ‘checks and balances’ needed 
to improve governance and outcomes in the 
oil and gas sector. Even though contracts are 
commercial transactions, they have a public 
element that creates a strong argument 
for transparency and public scrutiny. A 
primary aim of this guide is to increase public 
awareness about oil contracts and how their 
terms and conditions affect the distribution 
of the risks, costs and benefits involved in oil 
projects. A good understanding of the complex 
issues involved in oil and gas contracts adds a 
powerful tool in the civil society toolbox. This 
section briefly discusses the roles that civil 
society can play to increase accountability and 
public scrutiny in the extractive industries, 
with a focus on oil contracts. Civil society 
can help improve transparency of extractive 
industry contracting in a number of ways, 
including:
•	 assisting the public in accessing contractual 
terms and conditions5
•	 providing the public with state-of-the-art 
legal, economic and financial analyses of 
the terms and conditions reflected in the 
contracts
•	 providing the public with information about 
the parameters needed to monitor contract 
performance 
•	 providing independent revenue calculations 
and monitoring compliance with 
contractual obligations
•	 disseminating information to the broader 
public, including the results of revenue 
monitoring activities. 
These activities concern not only the contract 
itself, but more generally the contracting 
process, from negotiation through contract 
management. In terms of pre-contract 
negotiations, for example, the following 
aspects can be independently monitored:
•	 the preliminary conditions of the tender
•	 the entry list
•	 the transparency and openness of the whole 
cycle of licence acquisition
•	 whether the criteria of the selection process 
have been met by the winner.
As to the contract itself, both revenue and 
non-revenue issues can form the object of 
independent monitoring by civil society. 
These aspects are discussed in the next two 
sections.
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5
5  In Azerbaijan, for example, all PSAs have the force of law, and are thus publically accessible. 
50 How to ScrutiniSe a Production SHaring agreement
5.1 Promoting transparency in 
contracting: Revenue issues
In oil contracts, the distribution of oil 
revenues is a key issue. It must be borne 
in mind that the end profits for both the 
government and the IOC are measured not 
by the estimates factored into contracts, but 
by actual revenues over project duration. 
In other words, it is necessary to establish 
whether there is any difference between 
contractual terms and actual practice as 
it evolves during project implementation. 
That said, the terms of the contract, and the 
terms of the pre-contractual tender process 
remain a primary indicator for actual practice; 
therefore, these terms and conditions are a 
vital aspect of financial analysis. 
Below are several examples of actions that 
civil society can take to monitor revenue 
issues in oil contracts:
•	 obtaining and analysing data on revenue 
distribution
•	 making recommendations to governments 
and IOCs, for instance as part of public 
consultations, multi-stakeholder dialogues, 
published reports or bilateral meetings
•	 comparing government and IOC revenue 
distribution
•	 comparing government take in different 
resource-rich states
•	 making recommendations for long-term 
revenue management 
•	 conducting opinion polls to assess public 
perceptions of the oil and gas sector’s 
impact on people’s lives, or to understand 
public expectations for the oil and gas sector 
•	 disseminating information and engaging the 
general public, for example by publishing 
alternative statements of revenues 
and other project benefits, organising 
conferences, assisting the media in 
reporting on transparency and effectiveness 
of revenue management, or holding public 
consultations on spending oil and gas 
revenues.
5.2 Promoting transparency in 
contracting: Beyond revenues
While this guide has focused on revenue 
issues, other contract provisions are also 
important and can form the object of civil 
society scrutiny. These provisions are not 
directly tied to tax liability or production 
sharing requirements, but have to do with 
social or environmental considerations. For 
example, contracts may require companies 
to implement social investment projects, or 
companies may implement such projects 
voluntarily. Contracts may also contain 
local content requirements to promote 
local participation in project activities 
through employment or procurement; these 
requirements are seen as a way of maximising 
local economic benefits. Also, oil companies 
are typically required to adhere to standards 
for the protection of the environment or 
human health. Monitoring compliance with 
these provisions can be as important to civil 
society as those obligations relating solely to 
tax liability and rent distribution. 
As mentioned earlier, social investment 
projects may be contractual or voluntary. 
Contractual social investment projects can 
be stipulated in the hydrocarbon agreement 
itself (the PSA, for example), or in a separate 
agreement with local groups. Where social 
investment requirements are included in a 
PSA contract, IOC expenditures relating to 
social investment (for example, construction 
of public buildings such as hospitals and 
schools) may be considered as part of the 
company’s cost recovery. In other words, the 
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government effectively then reimburses the 
company for these expenses. In contrast, 
voluntary initiatives are not contractually 
stipulated, but are often initiated by IOCs as 
part of their corporate social responsibility 
policy or to build relations with local 
stakeholders.
5.3 Monitoring social investment
A key issue is the extent to which social 
investment projects genuinely respond 
to local needs. A 2008 documentary film, 
Money Thrown to the Wind highlights some 
of the problems related to social investment 
programmes. According to the documentary, 
“over the last ten years, oil companies have 
invested more than half a billion dollars in 
the development of social infrastructure in 
Kazakhstan.” And yet, expenditure patterns 
would seem to cast some doubt about the 
extent of genuine community participation 
in the process. Five of the most expensive 
projects include: an indoor swimming pool in 
Atyrau (USD14.5 million), a health and fitness 
complex in Zhanaozen (USD14 million), the 
electrification of Atyrau (USD 12 million), a 
theatre in Uralsk (USD10.5 million), and a 
technical training college in Kulsary (USD9 
million) (Soros Foundation Kazakhstan 2010). 
IOCs can finance social projects directly or 
by investing in special funds set up for the 
local community. The arrangements for 
deciding what social investments to prioritise 
are crucial. In some cases, local government 
bodies decide, excluding or marginalising 
representatives of the local community. In 
others, inclusive and well thought out social 
investment projects can provide important 
benefits for local communities. Even relatively 
small amounts of money can foster social 
development in the area, but this requires 
genuine community participation and 
effective monitoring. So the key question is 
often not how much money is spent on social 
investment programmes, but how well that 
money is spent.
Local content provisions require oil 
companies to include local labourers or locally 
sourced materials in project implementation. 
The provisions can be included in oil contracts 
or in national legislation. For example, 
Kazakhstan’s new Subsoil Use Law, which 
came into effect in July 2010, includes clear 
requirements on local content. It requires 
mandatory contractual terms relating to the 
percentage of Kazakhstan personnel, goods 
and services. All new oil contracts must 
include local content targets, and all projects 
must comply with the new Subsoil Use Law 
in regard to local content. Through a phased 
process, this also includes contracts that are 
already being implemented. The new law also 
requires equal conditions and remuneration 
for Kazakhstan personnel, including those 
engaged in subcontract work. The law also 
contains fines and penalties for failure to meet 
local content requirements. 
5.4 A final remark
Sustainable development is not guaranteed 
by big profits alone. Revenues are of little 
use if they are spent unwisely. Social 
and environmental considerations are 
as important as economic ones. And 
in managing the oil and gas sector, it is 
important to remember that the oil wealth of 
a country belongs to both present and future 
generations. 
The government of Kazakhstan has set the 
goal of becoming a top-ten oil-producing 
country by 2015. If we take into account 
Kazakhstan’s relatively small population, 
its high levels of literacy, a highly skilled 
workforce, and the government’s 
commitments to democratic reform, then it 
is clear that Kazakhstan is in a good position 
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to benefit from its oil wealth. However, it 
remains critical to learn lessons from positive 
and negative experience in other resource-
rich states. Transparency, accountability 
and public scrutiny emerge as key shapers of 
social, economic and environmental outcomes 
in the extractive industries. 
Civil society can play an important role in 
ensuring that a resource blessing does not 
become a resource curse. NGOs have had to 
learn by doing, and there are no one-size-
fits-all methods to increase transparency and 
accountability. In Kazakhstan, civil society has 
made significant efforts in this direction, and 
the experience of successful cooperation on 
the part of both government and companies in 
the country shows evidence of great promise 
for the future.
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a sampling of psas signed in Kazakhstan and azerbaijan
Table 14. PSAs for exploration and production signed with Kazakhstan
Operator Field Comment Participant
Karachaganak 
Petroleum Operating
Karachaganak Signed in 1997 for a 
40-year term.
BG (32.5%)
ENI (32.5%)
Chevron (20%)
KazMunaiGaz (20%)
LukArco (5%)
NCOC Kashagan Signed in 1997 for 
a 40-year term, but 
amended in 2008.
KazMunaiGaz (16.81%)
ENI (16.66%)
Exxon (16.66%)
Shell (16.66%)
Total (16.66%)
Inpex  (8.28%)
ConocoPhilips (8.28%)
JV Kurmangazy-
Petroleum
Kurmangazy Signed in July 2005. Kazmunai-Teniz
(KazMunaiGaz subsidiary) (50%)
LLP RNKazakhstan
(Rosneft subsidiary) (25%)
Zarubezh-Neft (25%)
Tyb-Karagan 
Operating Co.
Tyub-Karagan Signed in December 
2003.
Lukoil Overseas (50%) 
KazMunaiGaz (50%)
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Table 15. PSAs for production signed with Azerbaijan
Operator Field Comment Project 
manager
AIOC Azeri, Chirag 
and Gunashli
Signed on 20 September 1994; Ratified 
by Parliament on 15 November 1994; 
enacted as a Presidential decree on 12 
December 1994.
BP
BP Exploration 
(Shah-Deniz)
Shakh-Deniz Signed on 4 June 1996; ratified by 
Parliament on 4 October 1996; enacted 
as a Presidential decree on 9 October 
1996.
BP
Salyan Oil Kyursengi and 
Garabagly
Signed on 15 December 1998; ratified by 
Parliament on 16 April 1999; enacted as a 
Presidential decree on 27 April 1999.
CNPC
Karasu 
Operating Co.
Kelametdin and 
Mishovdag
Signed on 12 September 2000; ratified by 
Parliament on 25 October 2000; enacted 
as a Presidential Decree on 5 November 
2000.
Nations Energy
Gobustan 
Operating Co.
South West 
Gobustan
Signed on 2 June 1998; ratified by 
Parliament on 13 November 1998; 
enacted as a Presidential Decree on 1 
December 1998.
CNPC
Kura Valley Co. Padar Signed on 27 April 1999; ratified by 
Parliament on 25 June 2000; enacted as 
a Presidential decree on 25 July 2000.
Nations Energy
AzShengli 
Operating Co.
Pirsaat Signed on 4 June 2003; ratified by 
Parliament on 2 December 2003; enacted 
as a Presidential decree on 26 December 
2003.
Shengli Oil
Binagadi Oil 
Operating Co.
Binagadi Block Signed on 18 June 2004; ratified by 
Parliament on 29 April 2005.
AZEN Oil
Garachukhur Oil 
Operating Co.
Garachukhur 
Block
Signed on 29 September 2004; ratified by 
Parliament on 29 April 2005.
Noble Sky
Surakhani Oil 
Operating Co.
Surakhani Block Signed in August 2004; ratified by 
Parliament on 29 April 2005.
RAFI Oil
Absheron 
Operating Co.
Zykh and 
Govsany
Signed on 3 November 2005; ratified by 
Parliament in April 2007.
RussNeft
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Table 16. PSAs for exploration signed with Azerbaijan
Operator Field Comment Project 
manager
LUKARCO 
Operating Co.
D-222 Signed on 4 July 1997; ratified by Parliament 
on 4 November 1997; enacted as a 
Presidential decree on 5 December 1997.
LUKoil
BP Exploration 
(INAM)
Inam Signed on 21 July 1998; ratified by 
Parliament on 1 December 1998; enacted as 
a Presidential decree on 28 December 1998.
BP
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appendix 2: useful internet resources
Energy Information Administration (EIA) information on Kazakhstan
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Kazakhstan/kazaproj.html
The Foreign Investors’ Council of Kazakhstan
http://www.fic.kz/
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
http://www.imf.org
The Kazakhstan Oil and Gas Ministry
http://mgm.gov.kz 
Kazakhstan Tax Code
http://www.kazembassy.org.uk/legislation_of_kazakhstan.html
JSC NC KazMunaiGaz
http://www.kmg.kz
The Agency of Statistics for Kazakhstan
http://www.stat.kz
Barrows Company: A legal library for the extractive industries
http://www.barrowscompany.com
The Tax Committee of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Finance
http://www.salyk.kz
Platts: Information for the energy sector
http://www.platts.com
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
http://www.eitransparency.org
Revenue Watch Institute (RWI)
http://www.revenuewatch.org
Publish What You Pay (PWYP)
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org
Kazakhstan Revenue Watch (Soros Foundation–Kazakhstan)
http://www.krw.kz
Oil Revenues – Under Public Oversight! Coalition
http://www.publicoversight.kz
Public Finance Monitoring Centre (Azerbaijan)
http://www.pfmc.az
IIED’s energy pages
http://www.iied.org/theme/6/Energy/projects
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This guide discusses the provisions of a particular type of oil and gas 
contract, the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA). While the guide 
is aimed at a general civil society readership, it draws particularly on 
experience from Kazakhstan.  Its purpose is to give an accessible 
account of some key characteristics of PSAs, with a focus on 
revenue issues; and to suggest action points for civil society 
organisations involved with monitoring extractive industries. Indeed, 
in recent years the management of extractive industry revenues has 
become of growing concern to public opinion in resource-rich states. 
Key issues include public participation in the contracting process, 
the economic fairness of the deal, the degree of integration of social 
and environmental concerns, and the extent to which the balance 
between economic, social and environmental considerations can 
evolve over often long project durations.
Now available in English, the guide was originally published in 
Russian by the Soros Foundation – Kazakhstan. Its content proved 
invaluable at two training sessions on extractive industry contracts 
co-organised by IIED in Central Asia (with Kazakhstan Revenue 
Watch) and in Ghana (with the Centre for Public Interest Law).
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